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ARTICLE 
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DAN M. KAHAN,α DAVID HOFFMAN,β DANIELI EVANS,χ NEAL 
DEVINS,δ EUGENE LUCCI,π AND KATHERINE CHENGσ 
This Article reports the results of a study on whether political predispositions 
influence judicial decisionmaking. The study was designed to overcome the two 
principal limitations on existing empirical studies that purport to find such an 
influence: the use of nonexperimental methods to assess the decisions of actual judges; 
and the failure to use actual judges in ideologically-biased-reasoning experiments. 
The study involved a sample of sitting judges (n = 253), who, like members of a 
general public sample (n = 800), were culturally polarized on climate change, 
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marijuana legalization and other contested issues. When the study subjects were 
assigned to analyze statutory interpretation problems, however, only the responses of 
the general-public subjects and not those of the judges varied in patterns that reflected 
the subjects’ cultural values. The responses of a sample of lawyers (n = 217) were 
also uninfluenced by their cultural values; the responses of a sample of law students 
(n = 284), in contrast, displayed a level of cultural bias only modestly less 
pronounced than that observed in the general-public sample. Among the competing 
hypotheses tested in the study, the results most supported the position that professional 
judgment imparted by legal training and experience confers resistance to identity-
protective cognition—a dynamic associated with politically biased information 
processing generally—but only for decisions that involve legal reasoning. The 
scholarly and practical implications of the findings are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Are judges politically motivated? Do they make decisions, at least in 
ideologically charged cases, on the basis of “policy preferences” or 
predispositions? 
Most members of the American public think so. Opinion polls suggest 
that about three-quarters of Americans believe that judges—U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices and lower court jurists alike—base their decisions on their 
“personal political views.”1 The charge that judges are “legislating from the 
bench” is automatic after decisions involving culturally contested matters—
from gay rights to gun control, affirmative action to stem cell research.2 If a 
 
1 See, e.g., DAVID ROTHMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS 
32 (2005), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/4_37pubtrust1.pdf [http://perma.cc/QY7U-M9BE] 
(“Overall, outcomes are seen by all respondents as least fair for persons who are low-income or who 
do not speak English.”); Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Bruce Hardy, Public Understanding of and Support 
for the Courts: Annenberg Public Policy Center Judicial Survey Results, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y 
CENT. (Oct. 17, 2007), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicy center.org/wp-
content/uploads/Judicial_Findings_10-17-20071.pdf [http://perma.cc/FG9B-YG3S] (“75% of 
Americans think that a state judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her politics to a great or modest 
extent . . . .”); Opinions of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/06/08/us/politics/ opinions-of-the-supreme-court.html 
[http://perma.cc/K6XY-VLVE ] (summarizing a survey in which 76% of respondents believed that 
Supreme Court justices “sometimes let personal or political views influence their decisions”). See 
generally KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: 
ACCEPTABLE HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 8, 112-13 (2010) (collecting and 
summarizing survey results indicating that “[t]he notion that state judges are political is indeed 
commonly held”).  
2 See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Editorial, When Judicial Activism Suits the Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 
23, 2009, at A29 (suggesting that “[j]udicial restraint has also been absent” in cases striking down 
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judge rules against an African-American plaintiff suing white officers for 
police brutality, or a female criminal defendant asserting the “battered woman 
defense,” the decision betrays “bias,” rank or implicit;3 if the judge rules the 
other way, then he or she is castigated for engaging in identity politics.4  
Experts also share the public’s assessment. Using multivariate regression 
models, some purport to measure the quantity of variance in case outcomes 
explained by judges’ ideologies.5 Others find evidence for judicial 
partisanship in experiments that demonstrate the impact of subconscious 
ideological predispositions on members of the public, including law 
students.6 The evidence, according to the experts, vindicates the public’s 
 
affirmative action plans); Editorial, Wrong Direction on Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at 
A20 (“In a huge overreach, a federal judge has decided that the legal interpretation that has governed 
federal support of embryonic stem cell research for more than a decade is invalid.”); Daniel Wilson, 
Lawmakers Want Same-Sex Marriage Laws In State Hands, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:51 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/620597/lawmakers-want-same-sex-marriage-laws-in-state-hands 
[http://perma.cc/YEE4-AG6A] (noting that supporters of state legislation banning same-sex 
marriage “were struggling against ‘activist court judges overstepping their constitutional authority 
by legislating from the bench’”); D. Robert Worley, Judicial Activism and the Second Amendment, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2013, 6:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/d-robert-
worley/judicial-activism-and-the_b_2412471.html [http://perma.cc/8ZEE-V7LS] (arguing that the 
modern interpretation of the Second Amendment is a product of judicial activism). 
3 See, e.g., Alex S. Vitale, Why Police Are Rarely Indicted for Misconduct, AL JAZEERA AM. (Nov. 
24, 2014, 10:00 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/ferguson-police-
misconductdarrenwilsongrandjury.html [http://perma.cc/KT6U-QPBQ] (arguing that racial 
attitudes stifle judicial regulation of police violence against minorities); Miranda S. Spivak, Marissa 
Alexander's Supporters Converge in Florida, WOMENSEWS (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://womensenews.org/story/domestic-violence/150124/marissa-alexanders-supporters-converge-
in-florida [http://perma.cc/LLG8-FSKQ] (“[A] lot of women face [imprisonment] for defending 
themselves [against domestic violence] . . . .”). 
4 See JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN 
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 44-70, 111-12 (1997) (arguing that the battered-woman defense is an example 
of the law’s receptivity to “excusing accountability for some group defined by their group 
membership”); The New York Stop and Frisk Law: Judicial Activism, MYREALITYLAW.ORG (Aug. 14, 
2013) http://www.myrealitylaw.org/the-new-york-stop-and-frisk-law-judicial-activism/ 
[http://perma.cc/Z3NA-3RPA] (characterizing a judge as “legislat[ing] from the bench” and 
engaging in “judicial activism” in upholding a constitutional challenge to police stop-and-frisk 
policy). 
5 See generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL 
CHOICE (2013) (attempting to characterize judges’ decisions based on ideological scores); JEFFREY 
ALLAN SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & SARA CATHERINE BENESH, THE SUPREME COURT 
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2005) (conducting studies on state and federal judges in an 
attempt to explain their decisionmaking in different ideological categories). 
6 See, e.g., EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY 
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING 4-5 (2009) (suggesting that even judges who 
believe they are acting objectively are “predisposed to find authority consistent with their attitudes 
more convincing than cited authority against desired outcomes”); Eileen Braman & Thomas E. 
Nelson, Mechanism of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. 
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impression that judges (despite their own protestations to the contrary) are 
just “junior varsity politicians.”7 
We disagree—not necessarily with the conclusion that judges are 
“politically biased,” but with the premise that existing empirical evidence 
furnishes secure grounds for crediting it. Popular judgments obviously are 
not conclusive: because members of the public lack legal training (indeed, 
lack comprehension of even the most rudimentary elements of the legal 
system),8 they necessarily are incapable of reliably assessing the validity of 
judicial decisions. Inferences from experiments involving members of the 
public—including law students—are suspect for exactly the same reason: 
because the subjects in such studies are members of the public, their 
vulnerability to unconscious ideological predispositions begs the question of 
whether the training and experience that judges possess immunizes them 
from such influences when they are engaged in legal reasoning.9  
Observational studies that purport to correlate the decisions of real judges 
with those judges’ “ideologies” have also been reasonably criticized for 
methodological problems. One is the obvious selection bias involved in 
 
POL. SCI. 940, 940 (2007) (“[L]egal training did not appear to attenuate motivated perceptions.”); 
Eric Posner & Cass Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops (Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper No. 501, 2015), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1953&context=public_law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/2Z9X-26ZH] 
(positing that short-term political commitments cloud decisionmakers’ long-term complex values). 
7 See, e.g., Book Discussion on Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View, C-SPAN (Sept. 
13, 2010), http://www.c-span.org/video/?297408-1/book-discussion-making-democracy-work-judges-
view [http://perma.cc/ZPC2-5EBT] (interview with Justice Stephen Breyer) (cited material at 
24:42 of video) (rejecting view that Supreme Court consists of “nine junior varsity politicians”). 
Although there does appear to be growing public consensus that the U.S. Supreme Court and other 
courts are “political,” whether judges are “too liberal” or “too conservative” is an issue that generally 
divides ordinary Americans in patterns characteristic of partisan divides on contentious issues. 
Supreme Court’s Favorable Rating Still at Historic Low: Few Conservatives View the Roberts Court as 
Conservative, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/25/ supreme-
courts-favorable-rating-still-at-historic-low/ [http://perma.cc/ Z8DC-94LE] (noting that Republicans 
tend to see the Supreme Court’s rulings as “liberal” while Democrats tend to see them as 
“conservative”). 
8 See, e.g., Jamieson & Hardy, supra note 1 (finding that less than one-third of the American 
public knows that U.S. Supreme Court rulings cannot be appealed). 
9 See Dan M. Kahan, Laws of Cognition and the Cognition of Law, COGNITION, Feb. 2015, at 56, 
59-60 [hereinafter Kahan, Cognition of Law] (noting that studies examining influences of motivated 
cognition on legal reasoning are not based on judges); Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 
Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2011) [hereinafter Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition] 
(noting that it is a mistake to infer vulnerability of public to motivated reasoning generalizes to 
judges). 
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studying only cases that are actually litigated.10 Another is the failure of 
researchers to specify the measured outcome variable in a manner that 
distinguishes the illicit contribution of political sensibilities extrinsic to law 
from the licit contribution of political sensibilities intrinsic to conventional 
legal reasoning.11 These methodological shortcomings, critics assert, raise doubts 
about the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from these studies. 
The most satisfactory way to overcome these limitations, we believe, is 
through valid experiments performed on judges.12 In this Article, we present 
the results of such an experiment. In this study, judges, lawyers, and law 
students were instructed to assess legal problems designed to trigger 
unconscious political bias in members of the general public.  
The experimental results furnished evidence strongly at odds with the 
conclusion that judges are influenced by political predispositions when they 
engage in legal reasoning. Judges of diverse cultural outlooks—ones polarized 
on their views of the risks of marijuana legalization, climate change, and other 
contested issues—converged on results in cases that strongly divided 
comparably diverse members of the public. Culturally diverse lawyers also 
displayed a high degree of consensus in their legal determinations. Law 
students, in contrast, did not; in addressing the legal problems featured in the 
experiment, they polarized along the same lines that divided the legally 
untrained members of the public, although to a lesser extent. 
These results strongly support the hypothesis that professional judgment 
can be expected to counteract “identity-protective cognition,” the species of 
motivated reasoning known to generate political polarization over risks and 
myriad policy and legally consequential facts.13 Legal training and experience, 
on this view, endows judges and lawyers with a specialized form of cognitive 
 
10 See generally Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Case Selection and the Study of Judicial 
Politics, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 407 (2008) (arguing that case selection influences Supreme 
Court decisionmaking). 
11 See generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1945-46 
(2008) (pointing out that in some cases the law requires moral judgments that, far from “tak[ing] 
the form of personal whim or preference . . . can include a situated and disciplined elaboration of 
the conventional norms of the American political community”). 
12 See Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments-an Analytic Review, 9 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 318 (2013) (“Although much can be gleaned from combining the 
experimental literature on motivated cognition with existing work on judicial biases more generally, 
there is a need for more targeted and systematic experiments that specifically investigate motivated 
cognition in populations of judges.”). 
13 See Dan Kahan, Fixing the Communications Failure, 463 NATURE 296 (2010) (likening 
“protective cognition” to “cultural cognition,” in which an individual’s group values influence her 
or her risk perceptions and related beliefs); David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, The Psychology 
of Self-Defense: Self-Affirmation Theory, 38 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 183 (2006). 
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perception—what Karl Llewellyn called “situation sense”14—that reliably 
focuses their attention on the features of a case pertinent to its valid 
resolution. The results of our experiment support the conclusion that 
“situation sense” is sufficiently robust to fix judges’ attention on such 
decision-relevant features of a case notwithstanding the tug of influences that 
might systematically focus the attention of the public on facts that are 
irrelevant—and indeed inimical—to impartial legal decisionmaking. Indeed, 
this dynamic creates a source of divergence between expert legal and non-
expert lay assessments of law akin to the divergence between expert and lay 
assessments of risk.15 
This form of professional judgment, however, does not furnish lawyers or 
judges with any special immunity to the reason-disturbing effects of identity-
protective cognition outside of the domain of their own expertise. The 
domain-specificity of judges’ (and lawyers’) immunity to this form of 
motivated reasoning furnishes insight into a variety of more general 
questions, including why the capacity and disposition to engage in conscious, 
effortful information processing does not mitigate, but rather accentuates, the 
polarizing consequences of identity-protective cognition in members of the 
public on climate change, gun control, and other culturally charged issues.16 
In addition to describing the design and reporting the results of our 
experimental study, we also offer a normative assessment of the findings. The 
conclusion that judges can in fact be expected to be neutral decisionmakers 
in many politically charged cases might be considered welcome news.  
But the results also support a conclusion that ought to be a matter of deep 
concern for the legal profession: our system of justice lacks reliable practices 
for communicating courts’ neutral resolution of divisive matters. As a result 
of identity-protective reasoning, diverse members of the public can be 
expected to form highly polarized perceptions of facts and highly polarized 
judgments about the dictates of the law in cases that resonate with contested 
 
14 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 59-
61, 121-57, 206-08 (1960) (outlining the similarities and differences of “situation sense” as it applies 
to judges and lawyers). 
15 See generally HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE 
EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1996) (theorizing that lay people miss cases 
that generally alter the analysis of risk, while experts take them into account). 
16 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT 
& DECISION MAKING 407 (2013) (describing research showing that cognitive reflection actually 
enhances ideologically motivated decisionmaking rather than mitigates it); Dan M. Kahan, Ellen 
Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa L. Ouellette, Donald Braman & Gregory Mandel, The 
Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 732 (2012) (citing studies disclaiming the notion that the public division on 
climate change rests on education). 
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cultural sensibilities. By virtue of their shared “situation sense,” judges of 
comparably diverse outlooks might readily converge on outcomes that reflect 
legal norms understood not just by judges but by citizens generally to supply 
the appropriate guidance for resolving such disputes. But because members 
of the public lack exactly that perceptive capacity, they (or a substantial 
proportion of them) will predictably understand the outcome of such cases to 
be rooted in partisan biases nonetheless.17 Deciding cases neutrally from the 
point of view of the law and communicating the neutrality of case outcomes 
to members of the public who are not legally trained, in other words, are 
completely different things. Judges might be experts at the former. But the 
persistent and widespread public sense that they are “politically motivated” 
suggests that the latter is not a component of their existing expertise. 
Because popular assurance of the law’s neutrality is itself one of the goods 
that law is expected to deliver in a liberal democratic society, the results of 
the experiment help to expose a serious deficit in the craft of judging. 
Remedying that deficit, we will argue, requires use of the same forms of valid 
empirical investigation used to identify it in this study.  
Our presentation unfolds in five steps. Part I reviews the defects in 
existing studies of the influence of ideology on judicial decisionmaking. Part 
II presents a short theoretical discussion of competing conjectures on how 
the professional judgment of lawyers and judges might be thought to interact 
with the cognitive dynamics associated with ideologically biased information 
processing. Then in Part III we describe a study designed to test these 
conjectures in a manner unconfounded by the defects in existing 
investigations of judicial decisionmaking. We present the results of the study 
in Part IV. Part V discusses the significance of the results, both scholarly and 
practical.  
I. EXISTING EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
This study is intended to contribute to the empirical assessment of the 
political impartiality of judicial decisionmaking. It is therefore useful to begin 
by reviewing the state of existing scholarship on that topic. 
Broadly speaking, empirical investigations of this issue can be divided 
into two classes: observational and experimental. Studies of these two 
varieties largely agree that “ideological” motivations, conscious or otherwise, 
make a contribution to judges’ decisions that cannot otherwise be accounted 
for by their use of conventional legal reasoning.  
 
17 See Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9, at 4 (commenting that both 
political parties criticize the Supreme Court for being excessively partisan). 
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In this Part, we briefly survey these two classes of studies. We also 
identify the grounds on which critics have reasonably questioned the 
adequacy of these studies. 
A. Observational Studies  
Associated with the disciplines of political science and economics, studies 
that use observational methods make up the largest share of the literature on 
the impact of ideological motivations on judicial decisionmaking. Such 
studies use correlational analyses—in the form of multivariate regression 
models—that treat the “ideology” of individual judges as one “independent 
variable” the impact of which on case outcomes is assessed after “controlling 
for” additional influences represented by other “independent variables.”18  
There are different methods for measuring judges’ “ideologies,” including 
(in the case of federal judges) the party of the appointing President19 and (in 
the case of Supreme Court Justices) the covariance of votes among judges 
who can be understood to be aligned along some unobserved or latent 
ideological continuum.20 Such studies tend to find that “ideology” so 
measured explains a “statistically significant” increment of variance in judicial 
determinations. Studies looking at the decisions of federal courts of appeals, 
which assign cases to three-judge panels for determination, also find that the 
impact of ideology so measured can be either accentuated or muted 
depending on the ideological composition of judges on the particular panel.21 
 
18 See generally EPSTEIN, POSNER & LANDES, supra note 5 (using this method to classify 
judicial ideologies). 
19 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, 
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006). 
Political scientists have enriched this measure in important and innovative ways that take account 
of, among other things, interactions between the appointing President and the confirming Senate. 
See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial 
Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (critiquing past efforts to quantify political 
analyses of the judiciary and offering new methodology); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A Hettinger 
& Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. 
Q. 623 (2001) (using a methodology that analyzes federal courts of appeals and their appointments 
in relation to senatorial preferences). 
20 See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) 
(explaining a formula-based study intended to reveal political preferences of Supreme Court Justices 
over time). But see Joseph Bafumi, Andrew Gelman, David K. Park & Noah Kaplan, Practical Issues 
in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 171, 186 (2005) 
(questioning the validity of the methodology used to array Justices and predict Supreme Court case 
outcomes). 
21 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical 
Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1104 (2001) 
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Critics of these studies identify methodological problems that they 
believe constrain the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from 
them.22 The most obvious of these is the sampling bias introduced by parties’ 
conscious selection of cases for litigation.23  
Parties are less likely to pursue litigation, either by filing the initial 
complaint or by appealing an adverse decision, when they recognize that a 
favorable outcome is highly unlikely. These cases either will not be filed or 
will be readily settled. Accordingly, the sample of cases featured in 
observational studies will be skewed toward ones where the outcomes are 
uncertain relative to the criteria that litigants have reason to know will 
influence judges. Any analysis confined to those cases, then, will necessarily 
understate the effective influence of the most effective outcome determinants, 
the impact of which consists primarily in steering a much larger class of cases 
away from litigation—and simply in regulating parties’ behavior in a manner 
that makes litigation unnecessary.  
Imagine, for example, that 99.99% of the effective universe of potential 
legal disputes, including many ideologically charged ones, were effectively 
removed from the sample of litigated cases by parties’ accurate perception 
that judges, despite their diverse ideologies, would agree on the proper 
results. Any inference that judges are “ideologically biased” based on the 
remaining 0.01% (1/10,000th) of potential cases—the ones that by hypothesis 
are indeterminate when assessed by non-ideological criteria—would grossly 
overstate the impact of “ideology” on judicial reasoning.  
We do not know, of course, what fraction of non-litigated disputes are 
removed from the observational sample by the parties’ accurate perception 
that the outcomes would be a foregone conclusion. Indeed, we do not know 
what fraction of those “missing” observations are ones that reflect the parties’ 
accurate perception that judges’ ideological predispositions would have 
dictated the results. But without access to such evidence—and with no way 
to form estimates that do not assume the answers to the very questions that 
are the occasion for conducting such studies—no inferences can be drawn 
about the true effect of outcome-determinates from the class of observed 
cases. 
 
(examining D.C. Circuit decisions involving health and safety regulations to determine if political 
party appointment affected case outcomes). 
22 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1922 (noting several methodological issues with 
empirical studies of judicial decisions). 
23 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that litigants are economically motivated and likely choose to pursue 
cases based on cost or likelihood of success). 
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Known as the “Priest–Klein” effect,24 this form of selection bias is 
understood to pose serious—many say decisive—obstacles to the use of 
observational studies for assessing the impact of changes in law or procedure 
on case outcomes. The implications for drawing inferences about the “true” 
impact of the political outlooks of judges is just as devastating.25 While 
sometimes acknowledged, the problems the Priest–Klein effect poses for 
observational investigation of the impact of judicial ideology have not been 
systematically addressed by those engaged in this form of analysis.26 
Another more subtle but equally serious problem for observational studies 
of judicial ideology is the classification of the dependent variable—“case 
outcomes.” In order to measure the impact of a judge’s “ideology” on 
decisionmaking, it is necessary to determine which outcomes are consistent 
with that judge’s ideology and which ones are not. Scholars doing 
observational studies generally classify outcomes as “liberal” or 
“conservative” based on the type of case and the prevailing party. For 
example, decisions favoring the government in “criminal” cases are deemed 
“conservative” and those favoring the defendant “liberal”; in labor law cases, 
 
24 See generally Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
169, 172-75 (2002). Note that the authors explore the converse situation to the one discussed supra. 
Namely, the authors suggest that parties may accurately perceive a common ideological bias among 
judges, and would be deterred from bringing cases that would likely be resolved unfavorably because 
of the judges’ common ideological bias; the resulting observations would therefore understate the 
effects of ideology on judicial decisionmaking. Id. (discussing the hypothetical “rightward shift” of 
judges). 
25 See Kastellec & Lax, supra note 10. 
26 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 19, at 126 (questioning 
the level of inferences that can be drawn when tracking judges’ ideological preferences). Typically, 
such commentators are content to note that it is not the case that plaintiffs win 50% of the time, a 
theoretical implication of the formal model that Priest and Klein developed to present their 
argument. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, CALIF. L. 
REV. 1457, 1495-97 (2003) (finding that the 50% hypothesis is not supported by empirical evidence); 
Christopher Zorn & Jennifer Barnes Bowie, Ideological Influences on Decision Making in the Federal 
Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Assessment, 72 J. POL. 1212, 1218 (2010) (questioning the importance 
of the Priest–Klein effect and finding that factors such as judges’ policy preferences are more 
influential). This is an unconvincing rejoinder. The Priest–Klein effect is not an empirical 
“hypothesis” that can be “disproven” by examining the success rates of particular classes of litigants. 
It is a logical point about how the biasing influences of unobserved variables in studies of litigated 
case outcomes affect the inferences that can be drawn from them. So long as there is reason to 
believe the dynamics the Priest–Klein effect identifies are at work, and unless one possesses some 
valid means for taking account of their impact, inferences drawn from litigated cases will be 
empirically unreliable. The observation that plaintiffs do not win 50% of the time does not supply 
any reason to doubt that parties’ expectations about their prospects for success have an impact on 
the sample available for study in observational studies of judicial decisionmaking. It highlights only 
the deep uncertainty about exactly how much and in what ways litigation-selection effects bias 
estimates of outcome determinants in litigated cases.  
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outcomes are “conservative” if they favor “management,” and “liberal” if they 
favor unions, and so forth.27  
The crudeness of this scheme not only injects noise into empirical 
analyses of case outcomes but also biases it toward overstated estimates of the 
impact of “ideology” on judicial decisionmaking.28 It is a well-known feature 
of the Anglo-American system of law that it frequently demands that judges 
resort to normative reasoning.29 There is no way for highly general concepts 
such as “fraud,” “unreasonable seizure,” “unlawful restraint of trade,” “fair 
use,” “materiality,” “freedom of speech,” and the like to be made operative in 
particular cases without specifying what states of affairs those legal provisions 
should be trying to promote.30 Under the “common law” style of reasoning 
dominant in Anglo-American law,31 the sorts of moral judgments that judges 
exercise to supply content to these types of concepts is not unconstrained; 
shared understandings of the general aim of the enacting legislature or other 
law promulgator, the appropriate deference to be afforded to previous 
elaborations of the content of the legal concept in question, and conformity 
to broader normative precepts that structure the law (“notice and opportunity 
to be heard,” “due process,” “like cases treated alike,” etc.) limit the available 
interpretive options. But in ruling out many solutions, the sources of valid 
normative inspiration that judges can draw on often do not rule only one in.32  
 
27 See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 20 
(2007) (discussing examples of ideological codifications for different types of case outcomes as well 
as the problems associated with these codifications); EPSTEIN, LANDES, & POSNER, supra note 5 
at 107-16 (noting that the definitions of “liberal” and “conservative” have changed over time); 
SUNSTEIN, SCHKADE, ELLMAN & SAWICKI, supra note 19 (explaining the methodology behind 
a study of three-judge panel decisions that used “liberal” or “conservative” to classify case outcomes). 
28 See e.g., Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1945-48 (arguing that judges’ ideologies are 
not necessarily extrinsic to the law, and that studies using measures of “liberal” and “conservative” 
fail to account for this); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis 
of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 485-88 (2009) (criticizing previous studies that simplify 
judicial opinions into a liberal–conservative dichotomy).  
29 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (providing an overview of 
different legal theories and their varying emphasis on judges’ normative reasoning); EDWARD H. 
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2013) (providing a realist explanation to legal 
reasoning).  
30 See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-
Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1655-56 (2009) (describing 
state court exercise of consequentialist judgment contemplated by conventional understandings of 
constitutional jurisprudence). 
31 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383, 405 (1964) (discussing persistence of “specialized federal common law”); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (describing 
ubiquity of statutes that implicitly delegate federal common lawmaking power). 
32 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 29; Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common 
Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357 (2015).  
  
2016] “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? 361 
 
In this environment, it is perfectly commonplace for judges who have 
competing “jurisprudential” orientations to disagree on what normative 
theory should animate a particular legal provision. It is not a surprise, either, 
that in those instances the competing orientations that guide judges will be 
correlated with alternative political philosophies or orientations on the part of 
the judges in question.33 Justice Douglas had a populist “economic 
decentralization” conception of “restraint of trade” for purposes of the 
Sherman Act; Professor and then Judge Robert Bork subscribed to an 
economic, “consumer welfare” alternative.34 These positions undoubtedly 
cohered with their respective political “ideologies,” too, and likely did as well 
with the “ideologies” of judges who championed one versus the other 
understanding of how U.S. antitrust law should be structured. But those who 
understand how the law works—and the contribution that judges, using 
normative theories, make, in imparting content to it—would not characterize 
this debate as reflecting extralegal “ideological” considerations as opposed to 
the perfectly ordinary, acceptable exercise of jurisprudential judgments.35 
Multivariate regression models are not necessary to ferret out the 
contribution that value-laden theories make to how judges decide these cases; 
judges openly admit that they are using such theories. Regardless of which 
President appointed these judges to the federal bench, no lawyer understands 
judges engaged in this sort of reasoning to be invoking “personal political 
preferences.”  
An entirely different matter would have been presented, however, had 
Justice Douglas or Judge Bork proposed deciding an antitrust, labor law, free 
speech, criminal law or any other sort of case based on the religious affiliation 
of the litigants or on the contribution a particular outcome would have made 
to the electoral prospects of a candidate for President. The Sherman Act, the 
Wagner Act, the First Amendment, and even myriad criminal law statutes36 
 
33 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1947. 
34 Compare C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas, 56 CLEV. ST. 
L. REV. 895, 924-25 (2008), with ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT 
WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
35 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“The 
statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize 
courts to create new lines of common law.”); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the 
Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983) (“[T]he judge will be alert to 
any sign of legislative intent regarding the freedom with which he should exercise his interpretive 
function. . . . If the legislature enacts into statute law a common law concept, as Congress did when 
it forbade agreements in ‘restraint of trade’ in the Sherman Act, that is a clue that the courts are to 
interpret the statute with the freedom with which they would construe and apply a common law 
principle . . . .”). 
36 See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1239 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting) (noting that “[the federal aiding and abetting statute] has never been applied 
  
362 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 349 
 
all demand the use of the form of guided normative theorizing we are 
describing. But the bare desire to use legal outcomes in particular cases (or in 
large classes of them) to disadvantage those who subscribe to a disfavored 
view of the best life or to advance the cause of a particular political party is 
plainly outside the range of considerations that can validly be appealed to in 
the exercise of normative reasoning intrinsic to law. Whether in the form of 
regression coefficient correlations, law-enforcement wiretaps, or 
anonymously leaked emails, evidence that judges of particular ideologies were 
being influenced by such considerations would be a ground for intense 
concern. 
There is a distinction, in sum, between resort to normative considerations 
that are internal to law and ones external to it. The former are licit, the latter 
illicit, from the perspective that lawyers and judges in the U.S. system of 
justice share of what counts as valid legal reasoning.37 
The “prevailing party” outcome-classification scheme used in 
observational studies of judicial ideology is blind to the distinction. As a 
result, such studies will count in their estimates of the influence of “ideology” 
perfectly mundane associations between the jurisprudential philosophies of 
judges deciding cases on the basis of normative considerations internal to law 
and the party of the Presidents who appointed them or the voting records of 
those judges and judges who feel likewise about the normative theories that 
inform labor law, free speech cases, criminal cases and the like.38  
The correlations that these researchers report could also be capturing 
judges’ reliance on illicit political considerations, external to the law. But, as 
critics point out, there is no way to know whether this is the case, or to what 
extent, given the indiscriminate coding of outcome variables that these 
studies employ.39 
Some candid adherents to the “ideology thesis”40 have acknowledged this 
point.41 But they have not supplied a response to what critics would identify 
 
mechanically,” but rather that “its scope depends on the structure and functions of the substantive 
statute[,]” the interpretations of which may be guided by normative concerns). 
37 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1947-48. 
38 See id. at 1927 (noting that outcome-based coding of judicial decisions ignores important 
purposes and factors of judicial decisionmaking). 
39 See Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 
MO. L. REV. 1 (2010) (criticizing current ideological coding of judicial decisions).  
40 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1959-62 (discussing points of support and 
criticism towards the ideology thesis). 
41 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 
844 (2008) (identifying as a “jurisprudential” issue worthy of “further exploration” the possibility 
that variance between Democratic and Republican judicial appointees might be explained consistent 
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as the significance of this concession. When observational-study proponents 
declare that they are finding that “ideology” accounts for judges’ decisions, 
they say they are measuring the extent to which those judges are not deciding 
cases on the basis of “law.” That is what gives this entire body of literature 
its currency—its “shock value.” But to the extent that the observational-study 
scholars are finding that judges who have different judicial philosophies will 
sometimes validly interpret the law to support different conclusions, then 
they are telling us something that already is clear and that gives no one any 
reason to be concerned about the quality of judicial decisionmaking.  
B. Experimental Studies  
Studies that use experimental methods have been used to examine the 
impact of motivated reasoning on legal decisionmaking. Motivated reasoning 
refers to the tendency of people to conform their assessments of 
information—from logical arguments to empirical data, from expert 
judgments to their own sense impressions—to some end or goal extrinsic to 
judgment accuracy.42  
One such interest can be to protect the status of, or one’s own standing 
in, an important affinity group, a form of motivated reasoning known as 
identity-protective cognition.43 The impact of identity-protective cognition 
in distorting assessments of evidence has been identified as an important 
source of political polarization over issues like climate change, gun control, 
the HPV vaccine, nuclear power, and the like.44 
Studies have demonstrated that identity-protective cognition can affect 
assessment of evidence relevant to legal decisions, too.45 In mock juror 
studies, subjects have been shown to form different assessments of the facts 
in cases involving alleged intimidation of pedestrians by political protestors, 
excessive force by police, and violent confrontations between private citizens, 
depending on the relationship of the group identities and values of the 
parties, on the one hand, and the study subjects’ own group commitments, 
on the other.46 Studies have also shown that identity-protective cognition can 
 
with “Ronald Dworkin's account of law as a search for ‘integrity,’ through which judges seek both 
to ‘fit’ and to "justif[y] preexisting legal decisions”). 
42 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480-81 (1990).  
43 See Sherman & Cohen, supra note 13, at 191-92. 
44 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 13, at 296. 
45 See Sood, supra note 12. 
46 See Yael Granot, Emily Balcetis, Kristin E. Schneider & Tom R. Tyler, Justice Is Not Blind: 
Visual Attention Exaggerates Effects of Group Identification on Legal Punishment, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 2196 (2014); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, Donald Braman, Danieli Evans & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech–Conduct Distinction, 64 
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influence the interpretation of formal legal rules—such as those relating to 
consent in acquaintance rape cases;47 or the use of deadly violence by battered 
women against their abusive mates and by “beleaguered commuters” against 
young African-American men.48 
These experiments avoid the methodological difficulties that mar 
observational studies. In an experiment, the researcher can directly measure 
the form of group commitments that she hypothesizes have the potential to 
unconsciously bias the decisionmaker. Moreover, she can “select” the case, 
designing it in a manner that enables unbiased observation of the 
responsiveness of the study subject to experimentally manipulated sources of 
identity-protective motivation that are analytically independent of the legal 
rules or forms of legal reasoning appropriate for deciding it. If the 
experimental manipulation generates the hypothesized differences in the 
outcomes of decisionmakers with opposing identities, the inference that their 
reasoning was biased by ideological commitments extrinsic to the law is ironclad. 
Nonetheless, existing identity-protective cognition experiments suffer 
from their own limitation: they have not been performed on judges. Mock 
jury studies have involved legally untrained members of the public.49 Studies 
involving legal reasoning, too, have involved either members of the public, 
or else college or law school students.50 
This is a serious limitation.51 Experimental studies of identity-protective 
cognition have deepened scientific understanding of human decisionmaking. 
But neither the vulnerability of individuals to this bias nor the threat that it 
poses to liberal ideals of neutrality comes as a great revelation to the law.52 
Doctrines of constitutional law anticipate identity-protective cognition in 
legislators: the Free Speech, Due Process, Equal Protection, and Free 
Exercise Clauses not only prohibit lawmakers from expressly imposing a 
 
STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012); Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are 
You Going to Believe? Scott V. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 
(2009). 
47 See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in 
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 804-06 (2010). 
48 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2008). 
49 See e.g., id.; Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 46; Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter 
McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 274 
(2012); Avani Mehta Sood & John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization 
Goals, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1324-25 (2012). 
50 See BRAMAN, supra note 6, at 87; Braman & Nelson, supra note 6, at 945; Ward Farnsworth, 
Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Implicit Bias in Legal Interpretation (John M. Olin Program in Law & 
Economics, Working Paper No. 577, 2011). 
51 See Sood, supra note 12, at 318. 
52 See Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9, at 4. 
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cultural orthodoxy,53 but also mandate strict scrutiny to flush out hidden 
motivations for disadvantaging those who deviate from dominant norms.54 
Procedural rules recognize the same vulnerability in jurors, forbidding the 
introduction of evidence that might excite aversion to a party’s identity or 
values.55 Instilling the reasoning skills and habits of mind essential to 
administering these rules in a reliable and even-handed manner is one of—if 
not the—central objective of legal training. 
Because the entire point of this regime is to insulate the law from the 
impact of identity-protective cognition on ordinary members of the public, it 
is question-begging to cite the public’s vulnerability to that bias as reason to 
believe that it distorts the reasoning of judges as well.56 It is certainly not 
unreasonable—indeed, it is quite plausible—to hypothesize that identity-
protective cognition could be disabling judges from shielding liberal 
democratic government from the threat posed to it by its diverse citizenry’s 
own vulnerability to identity-protective cognition. But to the extent that such 
conjecture is based on casual observation of how courts resolve controversial 
cases, the experimental study of identity-protective cognition actually 
furnishes strong evidence to be skeptical of such a surmise: those studies show 
us that ordinary members of the public, precisely because they selectively 
credit and discredit all manner of information in patterns congenial to their 
own cultural predispositions, can be expected to perceive court decisions they 
disagree with as biased even if those decisions reflect the impartial application 
of neutral principles of law.57 
 
53 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”). 
54 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY 0F JUDICIAL REVIEW 
146 (1980) (“[S]pecial scrutiny . . . turns out to be a way of ‘flushing out’ unconstitutional motivation 
. . . .”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431 n.55, 453-55, 500-01 (1996) (arguing that the strict 
scrutiny standard is a means of measuring government motive in passing laws that disadvantage 
certain groups); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436-37 (1997) (“[Strict 
scrutiny’s] function . . . is to smoke out illegitimate purposes that cannot be a valid basis for state 
action under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
55 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (barring “character propensity” proof); FED. R. EVID. 610 
(barring “evidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions . . . to attack or support the witness’s 
credibility”). 
56 Cf. BRAMAN, supra note 6, at 87-89; Braman & Nelson, supra note 6, at 940-45 (implying 
that the results of an experiment with students support inferences on how judges reason in legal 
decisions). 
57 See Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 60. Some judges report believing that identity-
protective cognition or related forms of motivated reasoning also affect judicial reasoning. See, e.g., 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 116 (2008) (asserting that judges rely on “cultural 
cognition” in assessing empirical claims). We do not think that this is relevant evidence. The impact 
  
366 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 349 
 
The only valid means to test whether judges are prone to ideological bias 
as a result of identity-protective cognition is to perform valid identity-
protective cognition studies on actual judges.58 No such studies have yet been 
performed.59 
But two are at least suggestive. In an important recent article, Andrew 
Wistrich, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Chris Guthrie report a series of experiments 
that compared the determinations of judges randomly assigned to conditions 
that featured either “sympathetic” or “unsympathetic” litigants.60 In one 
involving the application of a medical marijuana statute, a larger proportion 
of judges accepted the adequacy of a medical-need affidavit proffered by a 
middle-aged man who was “married with three children,” “employed as an 
accountant,” and who “lacked a “criminal record” than that of a 19-year old 
“currently unemployed” man who was “on probation for beating his ex-
girlfriend, and had a juvenile record for drug possession and drug dealing.” 
Similarly, a group of bankruptcy judges were less likely to discharge the debt 
of a college student who used a credit card “for spring break, where she 
charged her hotel room, meals, and rounds of drinks for friends,” than they 
were to discharge that of a student who used the card to visit and buy 
medicines for her mother, “who was battling cancer, lacked health insurance, 
and needed assistance recovering from a recent surgery.”61 The authors treat 
these and similar results as evidence that the judges’ had been “motivated” to 
reach outcomes that matched their “emotional” evaluations of the parties.62 
Significantly, however, judges of different political ideologies did not react 
differently to the experimental stimuli.63 Indeed, Wistrich et al. express 
surprise at “the lack of a political influence given the widespread findings [in 
observational studies] that politics influences appellate judges.”64 Because 
Wistrich et. al report that their experiments furnished “little support for the 
proposition that political ideology drives much judicial decision making,”65 it 
 
of unconscious biases on oneself cannot be reliably detected by introspection, much less discerned 
in others via casual observation. See generally Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias 
Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 
(2002). 
58 Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 60; Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, 
supra note 9, at 27-28. 
59 See Sood, supra note 12, at 318 (“[T]here is a need for more targeted and systematic 
experiments that specifically investigate motivated cognition in populations of judges.”).  
60 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges 
Follow the Law of Follow Their Feelings?, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 855 (2015). 
61 Id. at 888. 
62 See id. at 899-900. 
63 See id. at 880, 889-90. 
64 Id. at 880. 
65 Id. at 899. 
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is tempting to treat their results as evidence that politically motivated 
reasoning does not affect judges.  
We would understand, however, why a reasonable person might not be 
persuaded by this interpretation. By their own account, Wistrich et al. 
designed their experiments to test whether “emotions” would motivate judges 
in general to “bend[] the law to achieve justice.”66 It is unclear whether 
indulging this shared sense of justice actually required much law bending on 
the part of the judges in the studies.67 But what is clear is that the Wistrich 
et al. experiments simply were not designed in a manner that could have been 
expected to generate divergent responses among judges with conflicting 
conceptions of justice based on opposing ideologies. 
The second study—another well done and important one—was designed 
to do exactly that.68 In it, Richard Redding and N. Dickon Reppucci tested 
how a sample of judges and law students reacted to social science studies 
relating to the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty.69 In both students and 
judges, pre-existing opinions and political outlooks were correlated with the 
subjects’ decision to afford “dispositive weight” to the studies in determining 
the constitutionality of the death penalty. The same factors, however, 
influenced only the students’ and not the judges’ assessments of the 
admissibility of such evidence in legal proceedings.70 
Certain features of the design of the Redding–Reppucci study admittedly 
limit the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from it. First, the study 
was not suited to assessing motivated reasoning. In examining whether their 
subjects were willing to treat the deterrence studies as “dispositive” for their 
legal rulings, Redding and Reppucci effectively measured whether their 
subjects’ changed their views after being exposed to contrary evidence. The 
 
66 Id. at 899. 
67 Some of Wistrich et al.’s results can fairly be read this way but many cannot. In the medical-
marijuana problem, for example, the statute expressly stated that the medical-need affidavit must 
indicate that the “the medical use of marijuana” was necessary “to treat or alleviate the person’s 
serious or debilitating medical condition or symptoms.” Id. at 914 (emphasis added). The “sympa-
thetic” party’s affidavit in fact described him as suffering from “severe pain caused by bone cancer,” 
a “debilitating” condition that “would likely kill him in a year”; the “unsympathetic” defendant’s 
affidavit, in contrast, stated that he was “being treated for occasional mild seizures” that were “not 
debilitating and might abate within a year.” Id. (emphasis added). In this problem, then, the emo-
tional sensibilities that Wistrich et al. attribute to the judges in the two conditions matched up with 
the language of the statute being construed. In the bankruptcy case, too, differing reactions to the 
“sympathetic” and “unsympathetic” parties’ reasons for incurring debt were relevant to the credibility 
of their respective denials of fraudulent intent, the honesty of which was the only issue for decision. 
68 See Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-Political Attitudes on 
Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1999). 
69 See id. at 34-35. 
70 Id. at 48. 
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subjects’ failure to do so could have reflected motivated reasoning but is in 
fact consistent with unbiased information processing as well. For example, 
subjects of opposing views could have viewed the deterrence studies as 
equivalent in significance to ones they had examined before the study. 
Additionally, those with opposing views might have viewed the contrary 
evidence as comparably strong but not sufficiently so to outweigh the force 
of additional evidence they had evaluated before the study. Ruling out these 
competing inferences requires a design that can detect whether subjects are 
in fact opportunistically adjusting the assessments they make of one and the 
same piece of evidence based on its perceived relationship to their pre-
existing opinion or their group identities.71  
Second, the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty does not uniquely 
determine the answer to the legal problem the subjects addressed: Is the death 
penalty unconstitutional? That question turns on additional normative 
considerations that are likely to be correlated with political outlooks but that 
are nevertheless intrinsic to law. A legal decisionmaker could legitimately 
rely on such considerations, then, without being engaged in “ideologically 
biased” reasoning.72 
Nevertheless, the Redding–Reppucci finding that judges of opposing 
outlooks did not vary in their rulings on the evidentiary admissibility of the 
studies furnishes some reason—contrary to the prevailing scholarly view—to 
think that judges will not be influenced by political commitments extrinsic to 
the legal issue at hand. That Redding and Reppucci found that the 
evidentiary rulings of the law students, in contrast, were so affected 
underscores the mistake of assuming that one can generalize from the 
vulnerability of non-judges to politically biased reasoning to the vulnerability 
of judges to this same impediment to neutral decisionmaking.  
But the bottom line can be stated simply: “[T]here is a need for more 
targeted and systematic experiments that specifically investigate motivated 
cognition in populations of judges” before any firm conclusions can be drawn.73 
 
71 See James N. Druckman, The Politics of Motivation, 24 CRITICAL REV. 199, 203-07 (2012); 
Alan Gerber & Donald Green, Misperceptions About Perceptual Bias, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 189, 
206 (1999); Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 60. 
72 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text; cf. Redding & Reppucci, supra note 68, at 48. 
This same difficulty—the use of designs that tested the influence of values intrinsic rather than 
genuinely extrinsic to the legal problem being addressed—constrains the strength of the inferences 
that can be drawn from various other studies involving law students and members of the public. See, 
e.g., Braman & Nelson, supra note 6, at 947 (manipulating the authorities in a constitutional law case 
pertinent to reconciling tension between anti-discrimination and free speech principles); Nadler & 
McDonnell, supra note 49, at 73 (manipulating the moral quality of behavior legally relevant to 
assessing issue of “causation”).  
73 Sood, supra note 12, at 318. 
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II. INFORMATION PROCESSING, PATTERN RECOGNITION    
 AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 
While no study has tested the vulnerability of judges to identity-
protective cognition, judges have been the focus of an impressive collection 
of studies examining other cognitive dynamics. Rooted in behavioral law and 
economics,74 these studies feature mechanisms such as “hindsight bias,” 
“anchoring,” “probability neglect,” and the like,75 the effects of which bias 
probabilistic reasoning.  
These studies suggest that judges enjoy limited but imperfect resistance 
to these biases. They thus reinforce the conclusion that the vulnerability of 
judges to identity-protective cognition cannot reliably be determined without 
the benefit of actual experimental inquiry. 
The important forms of experimental inquiry that have actually been 
performed on judges, moreover, do not furnish insight into this particular 
issue. Behavioral economics examines biases associated with over-reliance on 
heuristic information processing, which consists of rapid, unconscious, 
affective reactions. Labeled “System 1,” this form of reasoning is an 
alternative to “System 2” information processing, which is conscious, 
effortful, and analytic, and which is understood to counteract the biases that 
the behavioral economics inventory comprises.76 
Experimental study of identity-protective cognition, however, shows that 
it is not a consequence of over-reliance on heuristic information processing. 
On the contrary, multiple studies have found that the individuals most 
proficient in and most disposed to resort to System 2 modes of information 
processing are even more likely to construe information in a manner that 
evinces identity-protective reasoning.77 As a result, individuals who are 
revealed by one measure or another to be those least vulnerable to the biases 
associated with over-reliance on heuristic, System 1 information processing 
 
74 See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (proposing an economic analysis of legal rules 
and legal actors based in considerations of actual behavior that include fallacious and directional 
decisionmaking). 
75 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19-27 (2007) (reviewing studies of judicial 
decisionmaking which analyze the influence of anchoring, statistical inferences, and hindsight bias). 
76 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of 
Heuristic Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 267, 267-
68 (2005). 
77 See Kahan, supra note 16, at 416; Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman & 
Mandel, supra note 16. 
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are in fact the most politically polarized on contested issues like climate 
change, gun control, nuclear power, fracking, and the like.78 
Legal training and practice can reasonably be understood to cultivate 
proficiency in conscious, analytical forms of reasoning. Thus, the work on 
“motivated System 2 reasoning”—that portion of the literature that examines 
the tendency of conscious, effortful information processing to magnify 
identity-protective cognition79—might in fact be regarded as furnishing 
strong support for the conjecture that unconscious cultural partisanship can 
be expected to subvert judicial neutrality.80 
Nevertheless, when judges decide cases, they are not merely engaging in 
conscious, effortful information processing. They are exercising professional 
judgment. Professional judgment consists of habits of mind—conscious and 
effortful to some degree, but just as much tacit and perceptive—that are 
distinctively fitted to reasoning tasks that fall outside ordinary experience.81 
Indeed, it is characterized in many fields by resistance to all manner of error, 
including ones founded on heuristic information processing that would defeat 
the special form of decision that professional judgment facilitates.82 
The dominant scholarly account of professional judgment roots it in the 
dynamic of pattern recognition.83 Pattern recognition consists of the rapid un- 
or pre-conscious matching of phenomena with mentally inventoried 
prototypes. A ubiquitous form of information processing, pattern recognition 
is the type of cognition that enables human beings to recognize faces and read 
one another’s’ emotions.84 But it is also the basis for many forms of highly 
 
78 See Dan M. Kahan, What is the “science of science communication”?, J. SCI. COMM. (Aug. 25, 
2015), http://jcom.sissa.it/archive/14/03/JCOM_1403_2015_Y04 [http://perma.cc/NL8M -U8MM]. 
79 See Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erika Cantrell Dawson & Paul Slovic, Motivated Numeracy 
and Enlightened Self-Government 25 (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 116, 2013), 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/386437/23982003/1385735927633/ 
wp_draft_1.5_9_14_13.pdf?token=k3oG7Vfla1yerw5DPKyLzu6KN2A%3D [http://perma.cc/Q9UD-
CVWG]; supra note 16. 
80 In fact, evidence suggests that judges score higher than average on the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT), see Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 
2005, at 25, which is the standard measure of the capacity and disposition to use System 2 reasoning. 
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich report that a large sample of state court judges (N = 250) attained 
a mean CRT score of 1.23. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 75, at 14. The mean score in 
a general population sample is approximately 0.65. The score of the judges in the conference would 
place them between the 75th and 90th percentile for the general population. Kahan, supra note 77, 
at 410. 
81 See MARGOLIS, supra note 15, at 35. 
82 See id. 
83 See generally HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION: A 
THEORY OF JUDGMENT (1987). 
84 See PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON, THE SEAT OF THE SOUL: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 27-42, 123-32 (1995).  
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specialized forms of expert decisionmaking.85 Highly proficient chess players, 
for example, outperform others not by anticipating and consciously 
simulating a longer sequence of potential moves, but by more reliably 
perceiving the prototypical affinity of different board positions to ones that 
thousands of hours of experience have taught them confer an advantage.86 
Likewise, the proficiency of aerial photography analysts consists in their tacit 
ability to discern prototypical clusters of subtle cues that allow them to cull 
from large masses of scanned images ones that profitably merit more fine-
grained analysis.87 Forensic accountants must use the same form of facility as 
they comb through mountains of records in search of financial irregularities 
or fraud.88 
Expert medical judgment supplies an especially compelling and 
instructive example of the role of pattern recognition. Without question, 
competent medical diagnosis depends on the capacity to draw valid inferences 
from myriad sources of evidence that reflect the correlation between 
particular symptoms and various pathologies—a form critical reasoning that 
figures in System 2 information processing. But studies have shown that an 
appropriately attuned capacity for pattern recognition plays an indispensable 
role in expert medical diagnosis, for unless a physician is able to form an 
initial set of plausible conjectures—based on the match between a patient’s 
symptoms and an appropriately stocked inventory of disease prototypes—the 
probability that the physician will even know to collect the evidence that 
enables a proper diagnosis will be unacceptably low.89 
 
85 See Erik Dane & Michael G. Pratt, Exploring Intuition and Its Role in Managerial Decision 
Making, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 33, 42-43 (2007). 
86 See Herbert A. Simon & William G. Chase, Skill in Chess: Experiments with Chess-Playing 
Tasks and Computer Simulation of Skilled Performance Throw Light on Some Human Perceptual and 
Memory Processes, 61 AM. SCIENTIST 394, 402 (1973). 
87 See ELEANOR J. GIBSON, PRINCIPLES OF PERCEPTUAL LEARNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT 8 (1969). 
88 See, e.g., Jean C. Bedard & Stanley F. Biggs, Pattern Recognition, Hypotheses Generation, and 
Auditor Performance in an Analytical Task, 66 ACCT. REV. 622, 624 (1991). 
89 See generally James A. Marcum, An Integrated Model of Clinical Reasoning: Dual-Process Theory 
of Cognition and Metacognition, 18 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 954 (2012) (proposing a model 
of reasoning by treating physicians which relies on initial pattern recognition); Geoff Norman, 
Meredith Young & Lee Brooks, Non-Analytical Models of Clinical Reasoning: The Role of Experience, 
41 MED. EDUC. 1140 (2007) (demonstrating experimentally that expert medical diagnosis relies on 
initial recognition of significant patterns); Vimla L. Patel, David R. Kaufman & Jose F. Arocha, 
Emerging Paradigms of Cognition in Medical Decisionmaking, J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS, Feb. 
2002, at 52 (suggesting additional research into intuitive, non-analytical components of medical 
diagnostic decisionmaking); Vimla L. Patel & Guy J. Groen, Knowledge Based Solution Strategies in 
Medical Reasoning, 10 COGNITIVE SCI. 91 (1986) (reporting that accurate diagnoses in an empirical 
study were reached by physicians who relied on an initial experiential knowledge base before 
immediately resorting to hypothesis testing). 
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The proposition that pattern recognition plays this role in professional 
judgment is most famously associated with Howard Margolis.90 Focusing on 
expert assessment of risk,91 Margolis described a form of information 
processing that differs markedly from the standard System 1/System 2 
conception of dual-process reasoning. The latter attributes proficient risk 
assessment to an individual’s capacity and disposition to “override” his or her 
unconscious System 1 affective reactions with ones that reflect effortful 
System 2 assessments of evidence.92  
Margolis, in contrast, suggests an integrated and reciprocal relationship 
between unconscious, perceptive forms of cognition, on the one hand, and 
conscious, analytical ones, on the other. Much as in the case of proficient 
medical diagnosis, expert risk assessment demands reliable, preconscious 
apprehension of the phenomena that merit valid analytical processing. Even 
then, the effective use of data generated by such means, Margolis maintains, 
will depend on the risk expert’s reliable assimilation of such evidence to an 
inventory of patterns that consists in prototypical representations of cases 
that give proper effect to data of that sort. Of course, the quality of an expert’s 
pattern recognition capacity will depend heavily on his or her proficiency in 
conscious, analytical reasoning. That form of information processing, 
employed to assess and re-assess successes and failures over the course of the 
expert’s training and experience, is what calibrates the expert’s perceptive faculty.  
To translate Margolis’s account back into the dominant conception of 
dual-process reasoning, System 2 gets nowhere—because it is not reliably 
activated—without a discerning System 1 faculty of perception. The 
reliability of System 1, however, in turn presupposes the contribution System 
2 makes to the process of continual self-evaluation necessary to calibrate 
perceptive judgment.93 
 
90 MARGOLIS, supra note 15; MARGOLIS, supra note 83. 
91 See MARGOLIS, supra note 15. 
92 See Kahneman, supra note 76, at 1450-54; Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 76, at 273. 
93 See MARGOLIS, supra note 15, at 49-70; see also MARGOLIS, supra note 83, at 63-86. 
Margolis’s account is not so much an alternative to as an alternative conception of dual process 
reasoning. Again, whereas Kahneman tends to conceptualize “System 1” and “System 2” in discrete, 
hierarchical terms, Kahneman, supra note 76, at 1451, Margolis’s conception sees pre- or unconscious 
forms of information processing and conscious, effortful forms as integrated and reciprocal. There 
are other dual-process theorists who offer integrated, reciprocal accounts as well. See, e.g., KEITH 
E. STANOVICH, RATIONALITY AND THE REFLECTIVE MIND 139-54 (2011); Valerie F. Reyna, 
How People Make Decisions That Involve Risk: a Dual-Processes Approach, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 60 (2004). The work of Peters and her collaborators on numeracy, in particular, 
suggests a reciprocal, integrated conception of dual-process reasoning insofar as higher numeracy is 
associated with—because presumably it is activated by—more precise affective discernment of 
advantageous decisionmaking opportunities. See Ellen Peters, Daniel Västfjäll, Paul Slovic, C. K. 
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Karl Llewellyn suggested an account of the reasoning style of lawyers and 
judges very much akin to Margolis’s view of professional judgment. Although 
Llewellyn is often identified as emphasizing the indeterminacy of formal legal 
rules and doctrines, the aim of his most important works was to explain how 
there could be such a tremendously high degree of consensus among lawyers 
and judges on what those rules and doctrines entail.94 His answer was 
“situation sense”: a perceptive faculty, formed through professional training 
and experience, that enables lawyers and judges to reliably assimilate 
controversies to “situation-types” that indicate their proper resolutions.95 
Llewellyn discounted the emphasis on deductive logic featured in legal 
argumentation. But he did not dismiss such reasoning as mere confabulation: 
in his view, lawyers and judges (legislators, too, in drafting rules) employed 
formal reasoning to prime or activate the “situation sense” of other lawyers 
and judges.96 This is the same function that Margolis describes ratiocination 
 
Mertz, Ketti Mazzocco & Stephan Dickert, Numeracy and Decision Making, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 407 
(2006). 
94 See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 73-77, (Paul Gewirtz ed., 
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989): 
The words “legal certainty” seem to evoke in most lawyers’ minds an image of simply 
being able to apply an existing rule of law deductively. We are used to thinking like 
this, particularly since judicial opinions and legal discourse must always be dressed up 
this way so as to be socially acceptable. My claim would be, though, that for the cases 
which occasion difficulties, this kind of legal certainty never has existed and never will 
exist. . . .  
[Yet] [i]n spite of all this, the outcome of a dispute concerning the law is predict-
able to a truly amazing degree, and for that reason the law is (descriptively) certain. 
95 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 59-
61, 121-57, 206-08 (1960) (examining a variety of cases through the “situation-sense” framework). 
96 See id. at 183-91 (describing rules as forms of “singing reason” that reliably summon situation 
types); Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581, 
590 (1940) (examining cases to reveal that the successful appellant did not identify logical constraints 
on judges’ reasoning but “‘simply’ got the court to ‘see’ ‘the true’ rule and its bearing”). Some 
observational study proponents of the “ideology thesis”—the view that ideological predispositions 
shape judging independently of legal reasoning, see Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1945—
characterize their outlook as the “New Legal Realism,” and claim they are refining and sharpening 
Llewellyn’s views of judicial decisionmaking. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 41, at 831; see also 
EPSTEIN, POSNER & LANDES, supra note 5, at 25-63 (characterizing the use of ideological variables 
in multivariate regression models to constitute a “realistic theory of judicial behavior” and 
castigating so-called “legalists” and “anti-realists” critics of such an approach). Legal Realism, of 
course, comprised a diverse set of thinkers whose various theories of adjudication varied in their 
systematization and ultimately were only loosely related. But the equation of Llewellyn’s position, 
in particular, with the view that judges are motivated, consciously or unconsciously, by “political” 
sensibilities seems out of keeping with how Llewellyn himself understood his own work. To be sure, 
Llewellyn rejected the proposition that legal reasoning can be faithfully represented as the deductive 
application of formal rules. Nevertheless, he vehemently insisted—in opposition, in fact, to the 
views of certain other Legal Realists, most notably Jerome Frank, see Llewellyn, supra note 96, at 
  
374 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 349 
 
playing in professional discourse among risk experts97 and indeed in any 
setting in which human beings resort to it.98 
Margolis also identified the role that pattern recognition plays in 
professional judgment to explain expert–public conflicts over risk. Lacking 
the experience and training of experts, and hence the stock of prototypes that 
reliably guide expert risk assessment, members of the public, Margolis 
argued, were prone to one or another heuristic bias. By the same token, the 
experts’ access to those prototypes reliably fixes their attention on the 
pertinent features of risks that excite cognitive biases on the part of the lay 
public.99  
Based on the role of pattern recognition in professional judgment, one 
might make an analogous claim about judicial and lay judgments in culturally 
contested legal disputes. On this account, lawyers’ and judges’ “situation 
sense” can be expected to reliably fix their attention on pertinent elements of 
case “situation types,” thereby immunizing them from the distorting influence 
that identity-protective cognition exerts on the judgments of legally 
untrained members of the public. It is thus possible that the professional 
judgment of the judge, as an expert neutral decisionmaker, embodies exactly the 
form of information processing most likely to counteract identity-protective 
reasoning, including the elements of it magnified by System 2 reasoning. 
III. STUDY DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 
We performed a study to examine the impact of ideology on judicial 
reasoning. The study was self-consciously designed to remedy the defects in 
existing observational and experimental studies, and to test plausible 
competing hypotheses about the relationship of identity-protective cognition 
to lawyers’ and judges’ professional judgment.  
A. Design 
1. Overview  
Making valid inferences about how the professional judgment of lawyers 
and judges interacts with identity-protective cognition requires comparing 
 
593, 598-601—that judges can be expected to converge in their rulings based on a shared 
apprehension of the pertinent features of recurring “situation types.” See id. at 589-91. 
97 See MARGOLIS, supra note 81, at 67. 
98 See id. at 49-63; MARGOLIS, supra note 83, at 87-111. 
99 See MARGOLIS, supra note 81, at 35-36, 67-68, 94-95. 
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how lawyers and non-lawyers reason with regard to both legal and nonlegal 
decisionmaking tasks. That is what our study did. 
2. Sample  
Overall, there were 1554 subjects. Eight hundred of them consisted of 
adult members of the U.S. general public. Recruited and stratified for 
national representativeness,100 the sample was 49% male, and 76% of its 
members were white, 11% African-American, and 12% Hispanic. The average 
age was 52. The median educational attainment was “some college,” and the 
median income was $40,000 to $49,000. 
Two hundred and fifty-three judges participated in the study. 
Approximately 200 responded to solicitations issued to judicial conference 
attendees.101 The remainder were recruited from participants in two online 
CLE lectures.102 All were state judges and consisted of a mix of roughly equal 
numbers of trial and appellate court members. 
The sample also included 225 lawyers and 250 law students. The former 
were recruited via solicitations to attorneys in Connecticut, Illinois, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia and Washington, D.C. Law student 
subjects were recruited from Harvard Law School, the Temple University 
Beasley School of Law, William & Mary Law School, and Yale Law School. 
The law students were a mix of first-, second-, and third-year students, but 
those who had not yet completed at least one semester were excluded. 
In all cases, the solicitation indicated that the study was designed to 
enable study of legal and related forms of reasoning in members of the public, 
law students, lawyers, and judges. Beyond that, no information was supplied 
on the nature of the study. 
 
100 The general public sample was recruited by the public opinion research firm YouGov, which 
conducts online surveys and experiments on behalf of academic and governmental researchers and 
commercial customers (including political campaigns). The firm’s general population recruitment 
and stratification methods have been validated in studies comparing the results of YouGov surveys 
with those conducted for American National Election Studies. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Douglas 
Rivers, Cooperative Survey Research, 16 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 307, 320 (2013).  
101 The conferences included the 2014 Annual Conference of the Council of Chief Judges of 
State Courts of Appeals; the 2014 Annual Education Program of the Florida Conference of District 
Court of Appeal Judges; the 2013 Annual Judicial Education Conference of the Texas Center for 
the Judiciary; and the September 2013 Advanced Science and Technology Adjudication Resource 
(ASTAR) Center meeting (a seminar for judges on issues in forensic proof).  
102 The lectures, for which notices were issued by the National Center for State Courts and the 
National Judicial College, were furnished to enable judges to satisfy continuing legal education. 
Study solicitations were sent to participating judges, whose participation was of course optional. 
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3. Cultural Worldview Measures  
All subjects’ “cultural outlooks” were measured with abbreviated versions 
of the Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales (CCWS).103 The CCWS 
characterize respondents’ worldviews, or preferences for how society or other 
collective enterprises should be organized, along two orthogonal dimensions 
(Figure 1).104 One of these, “hierarchy–egalitarianism,” assesses how much 
subjects support or oppose modes of organization that tie authority to clearly 
delineated social roles and characteristics versus ones that view such roles and 
characteristics as illegitimate bases for the distribution of power and 
resources. The other, “individualism–communitarianism,” assesses the 
degree to which respondents prefer modes of organization that treat 
individuals as responsible for securing the conditions of their own flourishing 
free of collective assistance or interference versus ones that treat securing 
individual wellbeing as a collective responsibility that takes precedence over 
individual interests.105 
The CCWS measures have been featured in numerous studies involving 
identity-protective cognition.106 They are best conceived of, in our view, as 
merely one of many potential candidate “latent variable” measures of group-
based dispositions or outlooks that might be hypothesized to generate 
identity-protective cognition or like dynamics. Right–left political outlooks 
are another; CCWS measures are modestly correlated with such outlooks but 
have been shown to be more discerning of variance across a wide range of 
 
103 See Cultural Cognition Worldview Scales (CCWS)—Long & Short Forms, DECISION MAKING 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES INVENTORY, http://www.sjdm.org/dmidi/Cultural 
_Cognition_Worldview_Scales.html [http://perma.cc/624M-D7LB] (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
104 This scheme is itself intended to operationalize the “cultural theory of risk” associated with 
Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, RISK AND 
CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 
(1982) see also Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis (using grid or group analysis to predict 
and understand individual preferences), in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 83, 87-91 (Sheldon 
Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992).  
105 Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in 
HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY: EPISTEMOLOGY, DECISION THEORY, ETHICS AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF RISK 725, 730-35 (R. Hillerbrand et al. eds., 2012). 
106 See generally Kahan, supra note 13 (providing examples of studies that have used CCWS 
measures to analyze respondents' perceptions of various social issues, including environmental 
problems, nanotechnology, and human-papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations for schoolgirls).  
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contested policy,107 risk,108 and legal issues. 109 They also have been shown to 
display psychometric properties superior to other latent-disposition scales 
commonly used to study public risk perceptions.110  
Figure 1: Cultural Cognition of Risk 
 
 
Note: “Cultural cognition of risk” refers to the tendency of individuals to form perceptions of risk that reflect and 
reinforce their commitments to affinity groups whose members share values that can be characterized along two 
orthogonal dimensions: “hierarchy–egalitarianism” and “individualism–communitarianism.”111  
 
The conventional short-form version of the CCWS instrument includes 
twelve items, six each for the “individualism–communitarianism” and 
 
107 See John Gastil, Don Braman, Dan Kahan & Paul Slovic, The Cultural Orientation of Mass 
Political Opinion, 44 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 711 (2011) (concluding that cultural worldview scales 
display more variance among respondents and are less sensitive to differences in political 
sophistication on policy issues such as gun control, universal health care, elimination of estate taxes, 
and restricting carbon emissions). 
108 See Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman & Mandel supra note 16, at 732-35 
(describing a study finding that cultural worldviews have greater explanatory power than political 
measures for climate change and nuclear power risk perceptions). 
109 See Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans & Rachlinski, supra note 46, at 884 n.118 (finding that 
cultural worldviews are more discerning of biased perceptions of fact in legal controversy). 
110 See Wen Xue, Donald W. Hine, Natasha M. Loi, Einar B. Thorsteinsson, & Wendy J. 
Phillips, Cultural Worldviews and Environmental Risk Perceptions: A Meta-Analysis, J. ENVTL. 
PSYCHOL., Dec. 2014, at 249, 257. 
111 See id.; Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 149, 151-57 (2006). 
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“hierarchy–egalitarianism” worldview dimensions. In this study, an 
abbreviated version of CCWS consisting of only four items—two per 
dimension—was employed: 
CHARM. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from 
hurting themselves. 
IPRIVACY. The government should stop telling people how to live their 
lives. 
HEQUAL. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. 
EWEALTH. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth 
was more equal. 
Subjects responded to each item by indicating their level of agreement on 
six-point scale (“strongly disagree,” “moderately disagree,” “slightly 
disagree,” “slightly agree,” “moderately agree,” “strongly agree”).  
The decision to administer only four items in this study was made to 
minimize the probability of noncompletion by judges, who it was anticipated 
might be reluctant to respond to a high number of items assessing their 
values. It was anticipated that scales constructed from even these four items, 
however, would display acceptable psychometric properties insofar as the 
items in question had been shown in previous studies to have the highest 
correlation with the latent construct or disposition associated with the 
respective scales from which they were drawn. 
Factor analysis—which assesses the covariance patterns of prospective 
indicators of a latent variable measure—confirmed that variance in the 
subjects’ responses to the four items was best explained by two separate 
orthogonal factors, each of which loaded on (or were correlated with) the 
appropriate pairs of items. Scales formed with the two pairs of items reflected 
acceptable levels of measurement precision: in the case of hierarchy–
egalitarianism, Cronbach’s α = 0.73; in the case of individualism–
communitarianism, α = 0.64.  
Factor scores, which weight items in proportion to their correlation with 
the underlying latent construct, were used as measures of the subjects’ 
“hierarchy–egalitarian” and “individualism–communitarian” worldviews.112 
Standardized with means at 0, the measures were valenced so that positive 
scores denoted either a relatively hierarchical or a relatively individualistic 
disposition and negative scores either a relatively egalitarian or 
communitarian disposition on the indicated scale. 
 
112 See generally ROBERT F. DEVELLIS, SCALE DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS 103-37 (2d ed. 2002). 
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The cultural worldview items were administered to subjects after their 
completion of the legal problem and risk-perception tasks featured in the 
study. This particular decision was made to avoid the risk that exposure to 
those items would independently arouse identity-protective motivations that 
might affect subjects’ analyses of the statutory interpretation problems. 
 
Figure 2: Cultural Worldview Distributions 
 
Note: Distributions of subject types’ worldviews. Scores are standardized: 0 is the sample mean, and 
units are standard deviations from the mean. Subject type explained 7% of the variance in the 
hierarchy–egalitarianism scale and 9% of the variance in the individualism–communitarianism scale. 
 
Examination of responses to the worldview items suggested that variation 
between subject types was modest. Members of the general public sample 
were more hierarchical (M = 0.24, SEM = 0.04) and individualistic 
(M = 0.27, SEM = 0.03) than the other subject types. Judges were close to 
average in their hierarchy–egalitarian scores (M = -0.01, SEM = 0.06), while 
students (M = -0.38, SEM = 0.05) and lawyers (M = -0.37, SEM = 0.05) were 
modestly egalitarian. The students were close to average in their 
individualism–communitarianism scores (M = -0.15, SEM = 0.06), while the 
judges (M = -0.36, SEM = 0.06) and lawyers were modestly communitarian 
(M = -0.43, SEM = 0.06). As illustrated in Figure 2, differences between the 
outlooks of different subject types were relatively minor in comparison to the 
variation within the sample as a whole. 
The hierarchy–egalitarian and individualism–communitarian scales so 
formed are treated as continuous measures for purposes of testing the study 
hypotheses. For expositional convenience, however, we will frequently refer 
to subjects as either “Hierarchical Individualists,” “Hierarchical Communitarians,” 
“Egalitarian Individualists,” or “Egalitarian Communitarians.” When used in 
connection with summary or descriptive analyses, these labels will be applied 
lawyer
student
judge
public
lawyer
student
judge public
IndividualismCommunitarianismHierarchyEgalitarianism
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
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based on subjects’ scores in relation to the means on the two scales. In 
multivariate testing, the labels will be used to refer to subjects modeled as 
possessing combinations of worldview scores either one standard deviation 
above (for “Hierarchical-” and “-Individualist”) or one standard deviation 
below the scale means (for “Egalitarian-” and “-Communitarian”). 
4. Statutory Interpretation Problems  
Subjects were instructed to imagine they were judges and indicate how 
they would rule in two cases. Each case featured a statutory ambiguity of the 
sort familiar to lawyers and judges.113 Resolving the ambiguity was necessary 
to decide whether the statute, properly construed, applied to the behavior of 
a defendant or group of defendants in a government enforcement proceeding 
(civil in one case, criminal in the other).  
Each problem also involved an experimental manipulation: the identity 
of a party involved in the case was varied in a manner that had no analytical 
bearing on how the statutory ambiguity should be resolved but that was 
expected nevertheless to imbue the outcome with a cultural meaning or 
resonance that would generate identity-protective reasoning. Any tendency 
on the part of culturally diverse decisionmakers to adjust their interpretations 
to support the outcomes most congenial to their group commitments would 
thus supply unambiguous evidence of the susceptibility of their reasoning to 
values extrinsic to law.114  
a. Littering  
The first case, “Littering,” involved a statutory provision forbidding 
“littering, disposing, or depositing any form of garbage, refuse, junk, or other 
debris” on the grounds of any national wildlife preserve.115 The defendants 
had admittedly left unattended in such a preserve—a portion of desert along 
the United States–Mexico border—400 ten-gallon reusable plastic water 
dispensers, which they intended to be used and periodically refilled. The 
subjects were instructed to play the role of a trial court judge ruling on a 
motion to dismiss a civil penalty action against the defendants. As spelled out 
clearly in the case vignette, proper disposition of the motion turned on whether 
the defendants’ conduct could be deemed “depositing . . . junk” or “debris.”  
 
113 The statutory interpretation problems and other components of the study instrument appear 
in Appendix B.   
114 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
115 Cf. Disposal of Waste, 50 C.F.R. § 27.94(a) (2014) (containing slightly different language). 
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The experimental manipulation related to the identity of the defendants. 
For half of the subjects, the defendants were identified as immigrant aid 
workers, who anticipated that the water would be consumed by aliens crossing 
the desert to enter the United States illegally (“immigrant aid version”). For 
the other half, the defendants were identified as construction workers, who 
intended to drink the water from the containers themselves while working on 
a border fence designed to prevent illegal entry into the United States 
(“construction workers version”).  
The party-identity manipulation in Littering does not, in our professional 
judgment as a group of lawyers and one judge, have any bearing on how the 
statutory ambiguity should be resolved as a matter of law. Nevertheless, we 
anticipated the manipulation would trigger opposing identity-protective 
motivations among subjects of relatively hierarchic–individualistic outlooks, 
on the one hand, and subjects of relatively egalitarian–communitarian ones, 
on the other.  
Hierarchical individualists expect authority and status to be distributed 
on the basis of conspicuous, largely stable social roles and resent collective 
interference with the individual prerogatives that attend those roles. 
Egalitarian communitarians, in contrast, resent social orderings that feature 
sharp rankings in power and entitlements and treat securing conditions of 
individual flourishing as a collective responsibility that trumps individual 
entitlements.116  
It seems reasonable to expect that individuals with these outlooks would 
tend to disagree about how readily to accept immigration into the United 
States, or to excuse illegal entry by aliens seeking to escape from social 
deprivation elsewhere. Indeed, consistent with the dynamic of cultural 
cognition, they tend to form opposing perceptions of the risk that illegal 
immigration poses to societal wellbeing in the United States.117  
The party-identity manipulation in Littering was designed to affect the 
motivating stake of Egalitarian Communitarians and Hierarchical 
Individualists by altering the social meaning of a judgment against the 
defendants. A legal determination that the defendant immigrant-aid group 
was “depositing junk” or “debris” in the desert by leaving refillable water 
containers there for use by prospective illegal immigrants would be identity-
affirming for Hierarchical Individualists, but identity-threatening or 
identity-denigrating for Egalitarian Communitarians. One would thus 
 
116 Rayner, supra note 104; Kahan & Braman, supra note 111. 
117 See Dan Kahan, U.S. Risk-Perception/Polarization Snapshot, CULTURAL COGNITION 
PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH. (Dec. 30, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net 
/blog/2011/12/30/us-risk-perceptionpolarization-snapshot.html [http://perma.cc/565X-P86V]. 
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expect, if identity-protective cognition shaped assessments of the case, that 
Hierarchical Individualists would be substantially more inclined to find a 
violation than Egalitarian Communitarians in the “immigrant aid version” of 
the problem.  
The social-meaning valence of the case, and the corresponding 
unconscious motivations, would be flipped around, in contrast, in the 
“construction worker” version. There it would be Hierarchical Individualists 
whose identities would be denigrated and Egalitarian Communitarians whose 
identities would be affirmed by a ruling that workers building an exclusionary 
fence were polluting the desert. One would thus expect Egalitarian 
Communitarians to be more inclined to find a violation than Hierarchical 
Individualists in that version of the problem.  
b. Disclosure  
The second case, “Disclosure,” involved a familiar “mistake of law” issue. 
The statute in Disclosure made it a crime for a government official to 
“knowingly violate” a prohibition on “disclosing” to the public “confidential 
investigatory information relating to an identifiable private citizen.” The 
defendant, a police officer, admittedly disclosed to a private party what the 
officer knew to be “confidential investigatory information.” Nevertheless, he 
claimed not to “know” that he was “violat[ing]” any statutory prohibition. 
His ignorance of the prohibition, the vignette made clear, would not furnish 
the officer a defense if the term “knowingly” was construed to relate only to 
the confidential nature of the information, to its release, and to the status of 
the information recipient as a member of the public rather than another 
government official; if, in contrast, “knowingly” were construed to relate in 
addition to the existence of the prohibition on disclosing such information, 
then the defendant officer’s ignorance would be a defense.118 The subjects 
were instructed to evaluate these alternative readings of the statute for the 
purpose of ruling on the defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s refusal to 
instruct the jury that unawareness of the legal prohibition on disclosure would 
in fact defeat proof of a crime. 
The experimental manipulation in this case concerned the identity of the 
party to whom the defendant had made the disclosure. In the “pro-choice 
 
118 Compare United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) (holding 
that the term “knowingly” applies only to the defendant’s mental state regarding her conduct, not 
to her mental state regarding the regulation’s existence), with Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 
419, 432 (1985) (holding that “in a prosecution for violation of [7 U.S.C.] § 2024(b)(1) [(1982)] the 
Government must prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps 
was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations”). 
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center” version of the problem, subjects were advised that the officer had 
leaked the investigatory information to “a noncommercial ‘family planning’ 
center that provides free information on birth control and abortion services”; the 
information supplied by the defendant police officer was that an individual 
known to police to belong to an anti-abortion group had applied to the center 
for employment under false pretenses. In the “pro-life center” version of the 
problem, study subjects were advised that the information recipient was a 
“religious ‘family planning’ center that counsels women on alternatives to 
abortion”; the information was that an individual known to police to belong 
to a pro-choice group had applied to the center for employment without 
disclosing this part of his background. 
Of no consequence to the “mistake of law” issue in the case, the 
manipulation of the information-recipient’s identity in Disclosure was 
expected to provoke identity-protective cognition in individuals who are 
either relatively hierarchical and communitarian, on the one hand, or 
relatively egalitarian and individualistic, on the other. The former adhere to 
social norms that assign individuals role-based obligations (e.g., “mother” or 
“religious adherent”) to contribute to the wellbeing of one or another 
collective entity (e.g., “family,” or “church”) that is itself rich with status-
defined obligations. The latter, in contrast, chafe at distinctions in status and 
authority that do not originate in voluntarily assumed private agreements, 
and reject, too, the idea that individuals have unchosen obligations to 
subordinate their own well-being to the interests of any collective entity. 
The legal right to abortion is an issue that tends to divide Hierarchical 
Communitarians and Egalitarian Individualists (particularly female ones119). 
The former see abortion “at will” as devaluing the social status of women who 
successfully occupy matriarchal roles; the latter view legal protection of the 
“right to choose” as a token of society’s commitment to assuring that 
individual women, just like individual men, should be afforded esteem for 
mastering market and professional roles.120 Again, in line with cultural 
cognition, people with these outlooks tend to credit or dismiss asserted 
abortion procedure health risks in patterns reflecting the opposing cultural 
meanings that such individuals attach to abortion rights.121 
The identity-manipulation in Disclosure was aimed at varying the 
identity-protective stake that individuals with these cultural worldviews 
 
119 See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984). 
120 Id. at 158-92 (discussing the different worldviews of pro-choice and pro-life individuals). 
121 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C. K. Mertz, Culture and 
Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 465, 489-491 (2007). 
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would form in the outcome of the Disclosure case. In the “pro-life version” 
of the problem, Hierarchical Communitarians, we surmised, would 
experience an unconscious motivation to extend a defense to the police 
officer: such an outcome, we reasoned, would affirm their worldview by 
exonerating from criminal censure a state official who acted to protect a pro-
life family counseling center from subversion. Precisely because it treats such 
an actor as unworthy of legal denunciation, Egalitarian Individualists, we 
predicted, would be motivated to deny the officer the defense in that version 
of the problem. These positions would be reversed in the “pro-choice 
version”: legally condemning the officer for tipping off the pro-choice family-
counseling center would be identity-affirming for Egalitarian Individualists, 
we surmised, and identity-denigrating for Hierarchical Communitarians.122 
5. Risk Perception Measures 
In addition to the statutory interpretation problems, the study included a 
risk-perception battery. This portion of the study directed subjects to rank 
on an eight-point scale the seriousness of the risk “pose[d] to human health, 
safety, or prosperity” by a given technology, behavior, or state of affairs. 
Variance in responses to this form of risk-perception measure has been shown 
to be strongly correlated with variance in more fine-grained factual beliefs 
(e.g., in the case of “climate change,” whether human activity is causing global 
warming;123 or in the case of “private gun possession,” whether allowing 
concealed carrying of firearms in public has an impact on crime rates124).  
The risk measures were combined to form two scales. One—consisting of 
aggregated responses to items relating to global warming, nuclear power, air 
pollution, and water pollution—measured environmental risk perceptions 
(α = 0.80). The other, consisting of aggregated responses to items relating to 
the legalization of marijuana, teenage pregnancy, domestic terrorism, and 
illegal drug trafficking measured social-deviance risk perceptions (α = 0.65).  
 
122 Cf. Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans & Rachlinski, supra note 46 (finding that Hierarchical 
Communitarians and Egalitarian Individualists polarized on perception of facts after watching a 
video of a protest described as either an anti-abortion demonstration or demonstration protesting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
123 See Dan M. Kahan, Climate-Science Communication and the Measurement Problem, 36 
ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCHOL. 1, 8-9 (2015) (finding that risk perception of climate change is 
correlated with the belief that human activity is its cause). 
124 See Yoav Ganzach, Shmuel Ellis, Asya Pazy & Tali Ricci-Siag, On the Perception and 
Operationalization of Risk Perception, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 317 (2008); Elke U. 
Weber, Ann-Renée Blais & Nancy E. Betz, A Domain-Specific Risk-Attitude Scale: Measuring Risk 
Perceptions and Risk Behaviors, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263 (2002).  
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Items included in the risk perception battery were selected on the basis of 
previous studies that had established them to be ones that trigger identity-
protective cognition in relation to the identities associated with the cultural 
cognition worldview scales. We thus anticipated that the environmental risk 
perception scale would divide subjects inclined toward an egalitarian–
communitarian worldview from ones inclined toward a hierarchical–
individualistic one. We expected the social-deviancy risk scale to divide 
subjects inclined toward egalitarian-individualist and hierarchical-
communitarian worldviews, respectively.125  
B. Hypotheses 
1. Four Contenders 
As indicated, the rationale for the design of the statutory interpretation 
problems and the selection of risk-battery items was the expected impact they 
would have in triggering identity-protective cognition. The central aim of 
the study, however, was to test whether professional judgment of the sort 
generally exercised by judges and lawyers would counteract this species of 
motivated reasoning. Specifically, the array of problems, combined with the 
mix of different types of study subjects, was geared to assessing the relative 
plausibility of four distinct hypotheses. 
a. Universal Vulnerability  
One of the hypotheses was that the status of the subject—member of the 
public, law student, lawyer, or judge—would make no difference. All of them 
would display the same vulnerability to identity-protective reasoning in both 
the legal-problem and risk-perception response measures. We will call this 
the Universal Vulnerability (UV) hypothesis. Results consistent with UV 
would vindicate the dominant scholarly view that judges are indeed 
“ideologically biased”—or “politicians in robes.” 
Indeed, corroboration of UV would help to reinforce the two main pillars 
of research now thought to support the view that judicial decisionmaking is 
“ideological.” Such results would constitute more persuasive grounds for 
crediting the view that judges are politically biased than existing identity-
protective cognition studies, which, as indicated, attribute to judges 
decisionmaking biases observed in general population samples. Findings 
 
125 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Public Policy, 24 YALE 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, (2006); Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who 
Fears What and Why?, DAEDALUS, Fall 1990, at 41, 44. 
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consistent with UV would also help to quiet concerns about the 
methodological soundness of observational studies supporting the “ideology 
thesis.” A finding that members of the study’s judicial sample were as prone 
to identity-protective cognition as members of the general-public sample 
would not only be free of the distorting selection bias associated with the 
Priest–Klein effect.126 It would also furnish proof of ideological bias undiluted 
by the failure of observational studies to distinguish the licit contribution of 
values intrinsic to valid legal reasoning from the illicit contribution of values 
extrinsic to valid legal reasoning.127 
b. Identity-Protective Cognition Immunity  
Another hypothesis, which we call “identity-protective cognition 
immunity” (ICI), stands UV on its head. ICI posits that the form of training 
that lawyers receive effectively inoculates them from identity-protective 
cognition. If this is so, we would expect both lawyers and judges to avoid the 
forms of identity-protective cognition predicted to be triggered in members 
of the general-population sample. They would display this resistance to 
biased reasoning, moreover, for both the statutory interpretation problems 
and the risk-perception battery, for, on this view, legal training is seen as 
effectively negating vulnerability to identity-protective reasoning generally. 
A result consistent with ICI would, frankly, be shocking. As explained, 
previous studies show that identity-protective reasoning, far from being 
mitigated, appears to be aggravated by greater proficiency in the forms of 
critical reasoning that System 2 information processing comprises.128 Because 
legal training focuses primarily on critical reasoning, it would thus be quite 
remarkable to discover that it supplies a form of immunity to identity-
protective reasoning generally. On the contrary, the phenomenon of 
motivated System 2 reasoning supplies greater reason to expect UV than ICI 
to be correct.129  
c. Domain-Specific Immunity  
A more plausible alternative to UV is what we will call the “domain-
specific immunity” (DSI) hypothesis. DSI predicts that lawyer and judge 
members of the sample will display resistance to identity-protective cognition 
but only in their responses to the legal-problem component of the study. In 
 
126 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
129 See Kahan, supra note 16, at 409; Kahan, Peters, Dawson & Slovic, supra note 79, at 17. 
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response to the risk-perception component, DSI posits that lawyers and 
judges will display the same vulnerability that members of the public do to 
the pressure to assimilate their assessments of information to conclusions that 
affirm the status and outlooks of their cultural groups.130 
DSI is rooted in Margolis’s understanding of professional judgment as a 
species of pattern recognition. As we discussed,131 Llewellyn’s concept of 
“situation sense” furnishes an account of legal professional judgment 
consistent with Margolis’s. On this account, “habits of mind”132—consisting 
of effortful, System 2 forms of critical reasoning, certainly, but also intuitive, 
perceptive forms of cognition—equip lawyers, including judges, with a 
reliable capacity to fix their attention on the features of a controversy 
pertinent to its resolution. They also inure them to the influence of 
extraneous considerations that predictably bias the judgment on non-legally 
trained members of the public in much the same way that risk experts are 
inured to those biases on Margolis’s account.133 One of the sources of bias 
that lawyers and judges’ professional judgment would protect them from, 
according to the DSI hypothesis, is identity-protective cognition.  
It is worth specifying with more precision what an outcome consistent 
with DSI would look like in the legal problem portion of the study. One could 
interpret Llewellyn’s view of “situation sense,” understood as an instance of 
the form of professional judgment Margolis describes, as implying that judges 
will uniformly agree on how all or almost all legal problems should be 
resolved. But in our view, this would be closer to a caricature than a plausible 
rendering of the concept of “situation sense.” A more realistic (as it were) 
conception of “situation sense,” we submit, can usefully be understood as 
predicting that lawyers and judges will largely agree on case outcomes, and 
that when they do not, they will still agree on what sorts of considerations are 
appropriate to the reasoned disposition of such controversies. On this view, 
when one lawyer or judge disagrees with another’s view of what the “correct” 
decision is in a particular case, he or she will still be able to recognize that 
decision as validly decided because (or so long as) it is grounded in 
considerations that are indeed pertinent to its resolution under the law. 
A decision based on ideological considerations extrinsic to the legal rule or 
doctrine that governs a controversy (e.g., a cultural affinity with one of the 
parties) will be recognized by lawyers and judges as invalid whether or not 
they agree with the outcome. DSI, then, predicts not necessarily that the 
 
130 See Dane & Pratt, supra note 85, at 43. 
131 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
132 See MARGOLIS, supra note 15, at 49. 
133 See id. at 35-36, 67-68, 94-95. 
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lawyers and judges will uniformly agree on the outcomes of the Littering and 
Disclosure problems, although one might expect that they will be largely in 
agreement. It predicts only that differences of opinion among the lawyer and judge 
study participants will not reflect differences in those judge’ cultural worldviews. 
But again, DSI predicts that judges and lawyers will reliably converge on 
decisionmaking factors independent of their cultural outlooks only in the 
legal-problem component of the study because only that component of the 
study features the exercise of legal professional judgment.134 The outcome 
most consistent with DSI, then, would be one in which judges and lawyers 
resist identity-protective cognition only with respect to the legal-problem 
component and not the risk-perception component. 
d. Acquired Impartiality  
A final conjecture, which we call the Acquired Neutrality (AN) 
hypothesis, predicts that only judges and not lawyers will display resistance 
to identity-protective reasoning. On this account, what confers judges’ 
immunity to identity-protective reasoning is not the training and experience 
common to membership in the legal profession, but instead the habitual, 
willed exercise of neutrality that is peculiar to the task of judging. 
Conceivably, this acquired immunity to identity-protective reasoning might 
apply across all manner of domain; or alternatively, it might be more limited, 
negating identity-protective cognition in judges only when they are engaged 
in the form of reasoning that they use to decide cases. Under the former view, 
AN predicts that judges, but not lawyers, will resist identity-protective 
cognition in their response to both the legal-problem portion of the study and 
the risk-perception portion. Under the latter, AN predicts judges alone will 
avoid the influence of unconscious partisan reasoning, but only in the legal-
problem component of the study. 
2. Law Students 
What about law students? Obviously, if UV is correct, we should expect 
them, like lawyers and judges and members of the public generally, to display 
identity-protective reasoning in their responses to all of the study outcome 
measures. The same would be true under AI.  
 
134 See Dane & Pratt, supra note 85, at 43 (“Because complex schemas develop in a particular 
domain (one’s area of expertise), they are more likely to lead to effective decisions in that domain 
than when used in a different domain or context. Thus, complex managerial schemas may serve a 
manager well at the office but may lead to inaccurate intuitive judgments at home.”).  
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ISI and DSI, however, do not necessarily imply that law students will 
resist identity-protective cognition either. Students are at only an 
intermediate stage of professionalization; their “situation sense,” one might 
thus suppose, is imperfect. On this view, then, ISI and DSI could be 
understood to predict that law students would display identity-protective 
cognition, but to a smaller degree than members of the public generally.  
The Redding–Reppucci study found that, while judges were influenced 
by political commitments on a determination (the constitutionality of the 
death penalty) that turned on normative commitments intrinsic to law, they 
were unaffected by those commitments in making evidentiary rulings that 
were analytically distinct from such commitments.135 The same was not true 
of law students.136 As a result of that study’s design, there is ambiguity about 
the inferences that can be drawn from the results.137 Nevertheless, a finding 
in this study that the legal-problem responses of students, but not of judges, 
display sensitivity to the cultural congeniality of the experimentally 
manipulated case outcomes would supply reason to attribute the results in 
Redding–Reppucci study to the power of professional judgment to 
counteract unconscious political predispositions. 
C. Analytic Method and Statistical Power  
The study hypotheses feature competing predictions about the impact of 
identity-protective cognition on the various types of subjects in both the 
legal-problem and risk-perception components of the study. In the legal-
problem version of the study, we anticipated using multivariate regression 
analysis to test for three-way interactions between subject type, cultural 
worldview predictors, and experimental assignment in the statutory-
interpretation problem component of the study.138 For the risk-perception 
component, we anticipated using multivariate regression analysis to test for 
two-way interactions between cultural worldviews and subject type 
predictors. 
We anticipated using a hybrid “frequentist-Bayesian” testing strategy for 
the legal problem component of the study. In conventional null hypothesis 
 
135 Redding & Reppucci, supra note 68. 
136 Id.  
137 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
138 See generally JACOB COHEN, PATRICIA COHEN, STEPHEN G. WEST & LEONA S. 
AIKEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES 555-56 (2003); Charles M. Judd, Everyday Data Analysis in Social Psychology: Comparisons 
of Linear Models, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOLOGY 370, 374-75 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000). 
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testing, a hypothesis is deemed “corroborated” if one can “reject the null 
hypothesis” at “p < 0.05”—that is, if one can say that the probability is less 
than 5% that one would have obtained an experimental effect as big as (or 
bigger than) the one observed were the “true effect” zero.139 We anticipated 
using this form of analysis to assess whether different subject types’ responses 
displayed the relationship with their cultural worldviews that would suggest 
the influence of identity-protective cognition, and whether that impact 
differed in degree among different types of subjects.  
In contrast, Bayesian hypothesis testing assesses the probability of 
obtaining the effect observed in the experiment for two or more competing 
hypotheses. The relative magnitude of those probabilities is the equivalent of 
a Bayesian “likelihood ratio.” For example, one might say that observing a 
particular set of results would be 5—or 500 or 0.2 or 0.002, etc.—times as 
likely if one hypothesis were true than if a rival one were.140  
The likelihood ratio does not reflect the probability that a hypothesis is 
true. Instead, it reflects the degree to which one should, based on the evidence 
in question, revise one’s previous assessment of the probability of truth one 
attaches to a hypothesis or proposition.141 In an experimental setting, the 
likelihood ratio can be treated as an index of the weight with which the 
evidence supports one hypotheses in relation to the another.142  
Under Bayes’ theorem, the strength of new evidence (the likelihood ratio) 
is analytically independent of one’s prior assessment of the probability of the 
hypothesis in question. The weight to be assigned any particular piece of 
evidence, in other words, is to be determined on the basis of the validity of 
the methods and inferences that produced it—not on whether the evidence 
 
139 See generally ROBERT P. ABELSON, STATISTICS AS PRINCIPLED ARGUMENT 40 (1995); 
Jacob Cohen, The Earth Is Round (p<05), 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 997 (1994). 
140 See Ward Edwards, Harold Lindman & Leonard J. Savage, Bayesian Statistical Inference for 
Psychological Research, 70 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (1963); Steven N. Goodman, Introduction to Bayesian 
Methods I: Measuring the Strength of Evidence, 2 CLINICAL TRIALS 282, 287-288 (2005); Michael 
Lavine, What Is Bayesian Statistics and Why Everything Else Is Wrong, 20 UMAP J. 165, 166-167 (1999). 
See generally I. Jack Good, Weight of Evidence: A Brief Survey, in BAYESIAN STATISTICS 2: 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND VALENCIA INTERNATIONAL MEETING 249 (J. M. Bernardo, 
et al. eds., 1985) (describing evolution and benefits of use of likelihood ratio as devices for assessing 
evidentiary “weight”). 
141 See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1977); cf. 
Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1970) (“[A] defendant could be a thousand times more likely to be guilty 
than someone selected at random and still more likely to be innocent than guilty.”). 
142 See generally I. J. Good, Causal Tendency, Necessitivity and Sufficientivity: an Updated Review, 
in 1 PATRICK SUPPES, SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHER: PROBABILITY AND PROBABILISTIC 
CAUSALITY 293 (Paul Humphrey ed., 1994); Good, supra note 140. 
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supports or challenges what one already believes.143 Because neither the 
validity nor the weight of our study results thus depends on holding any 
particular prior beliefs about the political bias of judges, we report only the 
indicated likelihood ratios and leave it to readers to adjust their own beliefs 
accordingly. 
Based on previous studies, we determined that 800 subjects would be 
more than ample for observing meaningful identity-protective-reasoning 
effects. Sample size targets for judges, lawyers, and law students were 
determined after analysis of the general-public sample results, the effect sizes 
of which indicated that n’s of 225 would generate over a 0.95 chance of 
observing a comparable one, and over an 0.80 chance of observing one even 
half as large, at p < 0.05.144  
IV. RESULTS 
A. Legal Reasoning 
We consider first how the subjects responded to the legal-problem 
component of the study. We start with summary analyses based on simple 
tabulations of the responses of various subject types and worldviews in the 
different versions of the two statutory interpretation problems. We then 
present multivariate analyses designed to test the study hypotheses. 
1. Summary Data 
a. Outcomes by Subject Type  
Taken as a whole, members of the public displayed little agreement on 
the proper outcomes in the legal problems. Regardless of the version of the 
problem analyzed, members of the public split nearly 50–50 on whether the 
defendant in Disclosure had violated the statute—that is, on whether the 
statute should be read to require proof of “knowledge” of the illegality of his 
 
143 Psychologically speaking, the mistake of deriving the likelihood ratio or weight to be 
assigned new evidence from one’s prior beliefs, or more generally from one’s willingness to assent 
to the truth of the hypothesis, is confirmation bias. See generally STANOVICH, supra note 93; 
Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias, 114 Q.J. 
ECON. 37 (1999). 
144 The conventional threshold for statistical power—a measure of the likelihood of observing 
a posited effect size at a specified threshold of statistical significance, conditional on sample size—
is 0.80. See generally Stephen G. West, Jeremy C. Biesanz, & Steven C. Pitts, Causal Inference and 
Generalization in Field Settings: Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs, in HANDBOOK OF 
RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 40, 53 (Harry T. Reis & 
Charles M. Judd eds., 2000).  
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disclosure of confidential investigatory information to either the “pro-life” or 
“pro-choice” family planning centers (Figure 3). Members of the public 
assigned to the “construction worker” version of Littering were also close to 
equally divided on whether leaving reusable water containers unattended in 
the desert constituted “depositing . . . junk” or “debris” in a wildlife preserve; 
those assigned to the “immigrant aid” version, however, favored treating such 
behavior as a violation of the statute by a 65% to 35% margin (Figure 4). 
The statutory interpretation problems in our study featured genuine 
ambiguities. Dictionary definitions and rules of grammar did not compel one 
result over the other in either problem. It is thus not surprising that members 
of the public displayed a high level of disagreement on the proper outcomes. 
 
Figure 3: Disclosure Problem: Decisions Overall 
 
 
Note: Panels reflect the percentage of indicated type of subjects who selected indicated results in 
specified versions of the Disclosure problem. 
 
The situation was quite different, however, among both the lawyers and 
the judges who participated in our study. Regardless of the version of 
Disclosure they evaluated, decided majorities of both of these types of 
subjects indicated that the defendant police officer had indeed violated the 
statute (Figure 3). In Littering, decided majorities concluded that placing 
unattended reusable water containers in the desert did not constitute 
“discarding . . . debris” in a wildlife preserve—whether done by immigrant 
aid or construction workers (Figure 4). Most lawyers and judges, then, 
perceived something in each problem that guided them to a consensus 
interpretation, notwithstanding the ambiguity of the statutory language.  
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The overall level of agreement among the law students was intermediate 
between the ones observed among members of the public, on the one hand, 
and among lawyers and judges, on the other. In Disclosure, the students, like 
the lawyers and judges, were inclined to find a statutory violation in both the 
“pro-life center” and “pro-choice center” versions (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 4: Littering Problem: Decisions Overall 
 
 
Note: Panels reflect the percentage of indicated type of subjects who selected indicated results in 
specified versions of the Littering problem. 
 
The students displayed much less agreement on the proper outcome in 
Littering. In the “immigrant aid” version, they were almost evenly divided. 
They favored finding no violation in the “construction worker” version, 
although by a margin (62%:38%) that fell short of the ones by which lawyers 
and judges supported that disposition in both versions of the problem (Figure 
4). 
b. Outcomes in Relation to Subject Worldviews  
There was a noticeable relationship between the cultural worldviews of 
members of the public and how they ruled in the legal problems (Figure 5). 
Thus, in Littering, 77% of the Hierarchical Individualists assigned to the 
“immigrant aid” version but only 41% assigned to the “construction worker” 
version supported finding a violation. For Egalitarian Communitarians, the 
relationship was reversed: only 52% supported finding a violation in the 
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“immigrant aid” version, whereas 74% supported finding a violation in the 
“construction worker” version. These patterns were consistent with the study 
predictions of how identity-protective cognition would influence subjects 
with these outlooks in the Littering case. 
 
Figure 5: Outcomes by Subject Type and Cultural Worldview in Littering 
 
Note: Panels reflect the percentage of subjects of type and worldview who indicated support for 
finding a violation in one or another version of the Littering problem. 
 
Cultural divisions were more modest but still apparent among members 
of the public in Disclosure (Figure 6). Egalitarian Individualist and 
Hierarchical Communitarian subjects favored finding a violation of the 
statute by narrow but roughly equal margins (52% to 48% and 53% to 47%, 
respectively) in the “pro-choice center” version. But in the “pro-life center” 
version, subjects with these identities diverged: whereas 60% of the 
Egalitarian Individualists concluded the officer had violated the statute by 
alerting the anti-abortion family-counseling center of its possible infiltration 
by a pro-choice activist, only 39% of Hierarchical Communitarian subjects 
did. While less dramatic than the effect in Littering, this disparity, too, fit 
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the study predictions on how identity-protective cognition would affect the 
disposition of individuals with these worldviews to find violations in the two 
versions of Disclosure. 
There was no evidence of comparable effects in the responses of the 
judges. In Littering, Egalitarian Communitarian judges were slightly less 
likely, not more, to find the defendants had violated the statute in the 
“immigrant aid” version than were Hierarchical Individualist judges. In 
addition, the proportion of Egalitarian Communitarian judges who supported 
finding a violation did not increase but rather decreased slightly in the 
“construction worker” version (Figure 5). The proportion of Hierarchical 
Individualist judges finding a violation in the “construction worker” version 
also decreased by a small amount—but judges with that cultural worldview 
remained more likely to find the construction workers liable than did 
Egalitarian Communitarian judges. None of these differences, all of which 
were small, displayed the relationship between worldviews and outcome 
judgments suggestive of identity-protective cognition. 
The responses of the lawyer members of the study sample were also not 
suggestive of identity-protective cognition. In Littering, Hierarchical 
Individualist lawyers were modestly more likely to find a violation in both 
versions (“construction worker”: 33%; “immigrant aid”: 40%) than were 
Egalitarian Communitarian lawyers (“construction worker”: 25%; 
“immigrant aid”: 33%). The latter, moreover, were slightly less likely, not 
more, to find a violation in the “immigrant aid” version than they were in the 
“construction worker” version. In Disclosure, a higher proportion of 
Egalitarian Individualist lawyers (95%) than Hierarchical Communitarian 
ones (82%) supported finding the defendant officer violated the statute when 
he exposed the pro-choice activist’s effort to obtain a position at the religious, 
pro-life family planning center. But the proportion of Egalitarian 
Individualist lawyers who supported finding a violation (88%) was also higher 
than the proportion of Hierarchical Communitarian ones who did (83%) in 
the “pro-choice center” version, where the police officer had tipped off the 
pro-choice family planning center that a job applicant had concealed his 
identity as a pro-life activist. In both versions, moreover, lawyers 
overwhelmingly construed the statute as dispensing with the need to prove 
the officer “knew” his conduct was illegal. 
  
  
396 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 349 
 
 
Figure 6: Outcomes by Subject Type and Cultural Worldview in  
Disclosure 
 
 
Note: Panels reflect the percentage of subjects of type and worldview who indicated support for 
finding a violation in one or another version of the Disclosure problem. 
 
Among the students, in contrast, cultural divisions were again evident. 
Cultural dissensus was most pronounced in Disclosure (Figure 6). Eighty-six 
percent of Egalitarian Individualist students, but only 63% of Hierarchical 
Communitarian ones, favored finding the police officer violated the statute 
in the “pro-life center” version. But in “pro-choice”—the version in which 
the officer tipped off the pro-choice family counseling center of possible 
infiltration by a pro-life activist—78% of Hierarchical Communitarians, and 
only 65% of Egalitarian Individualists, supported finding a violation. This 
inversion reflects the pattern associated with identity-protective cognition. 
In Littering, comparable proportions of Egalitarian Communitarian 
students (68%) and Hierarchical Individualist ones (64%) favored finding no 
violation of the statute in the “construction worker” version. But in the 
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“immigrant aid” version, a 20% gap emerged between Hierarchal 
Individualist students, 63% of whom favored finding a violation, and 
Egalitarian Communitarian ones, only 43% of whom supported that outcome 
(Figure 5). This pattern was also consistent with the predicted impact of the 
experimental manipulation on individuals with the specified cultural outlooks.  
2. Multivariate Regression  
a. Generally  
The impact of subject type, worldview, and experimental assignment was 
probed more systematically with multivariate logistical regression analysis. 
For each problem, a regression model was constructed to enable statistical 
estimation of the probability that different subject types (member of the 
public, law student, lawyer, or judge) would find a violation conditional on 
the subject’s worldview and the version of the problem.145  
Monte Carlo simulations based on the regression models were performed 
to facilitate interpretation of the results. In a Monte Carlo simulation, the 
regression model outcome variable is calculated and randomly adjusted by an 
amount reflecting the measurement error associated with the model 
parameters. This process is repeated a sufficient number of times to populate 
the entire probability distribution for the outcome variable at specified values 
of the model predictors.146 Using this technique, the probability that a 
decisionmaker would find a violation was computed a thousand times for each 
combination of subject type, cultural worldview, and experimental 
assignment of interest (Appendix A, Figure A1, Figure A2).147 Differences in 
the predicted probabilities of finding a violation conditional on worldview or 
experimental assignment were determined in the same fashion.148 
b. Judges versus Members of the Public Using Frequentist Methods  
Figure 7 reports simulated estimates of the size of the interaction between 
subject worldviews and the experimental assignment for a member of the 
 
145 The regression analyses for the legal problems appear in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A. 
146 See ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 137-51 (2007). 
147 The continuous “hierarchy–egalitarianism” and “individualism–communitarianism” 
predictors were set at +1 SD; +1 SD for “Hierarchical Individualist”; +1, -1 for “Hierarchical 
Communitarian”; -1, +1 for “Egalitarian Individualist”; and -1, -1 for “Egalitarian Communitarian.” 
148 See Gary King, Michael Tomz, & Jason Wittenberg, Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: 
Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347, 349-353 (2000). 
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public and for a judge, respectively. There are separate estimates for each 
problem and for the “average effect” based on responses to both problems.149  
 
Figure 7: Judges vs. Public: Estimated Impact of 
Identity Protective Cognition  
Note: The figure is derived from Monte Carlo simulations based on Regression Model 3, Table A1, 
and Model 3, Table A2, both of which appear in Appendix A. The curves reflect the density 
distributions for the predicted difference in the probability that a decisionmaker with a particular 
worldview (either “Hierarchical Individualist” or “Egalitarian Communitarian” in Littering or 
“Hierarchical Communitarian” or “Egalitarian Individualist” in Disclosure) will find a violation if 
experimentally assigned to one version of the problem versus the other. A positive value for the 
difference indicates a differential consistent with the influence of identity-protective cognition. 
 
Based on the multivariate regression models, the density distributions 
reflect the predicted difference in the probability that a decisionmaker with a 
particular worldview (“Hierarchical Individualist” or “Egalitarian 
Communitarian” in Littering, or “Hierarchical Communitarian” or 
“Egalitarian Individualist” in Disclosure) will find a violation in one version 
of the problem versus the other. Equivalently, the curves reflect estimates of 
how much more likely on average a decisionmaker with a particular 
worldview is to interpret the statute differently when finding a violation 
 
149 The “average” effect was derived consistently with the methods prescribed in Robert 
Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin, Meta-Analytic Procedures for Combining Studies with Multiple Effect 
Sizes, 99 PSYCHOL. BULL. 400 (1986), for aggregating the effect sizes of multiple single-study 
measures of a single phenomenon of interest—here the disposition of different subject types to 
display identity-protective cognition.  
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affirms rather than denigrates his or her cultural commitments. We thus 
characterize the model outputs as indicating the predicted “identity-
protective cognition impact” (IPCI) of the experimental manipulations.150 
The most likely IPCI for any subject type is the mean value in the 
distribution for that subject type. The probability that the “true” IPCI is 
larger or smaller than that becomes progressively less likely, consistent with 
the bell shape of the probability density distribution. Ninety-five percent 
confidence intervals (or ones of any other size) for the “true impact” can be 
determined by identifying the predicted values that bound the relevant 
interval in the range of simulated probabilities.151 
The results confirm that the experimental manipulations generated the 
predicted identity-protective cognition effects in members of the public. 
Based on the regression model for Littering, for example, the predicted 
“identity-protective cognition impact” or IPCI for a member of the public is 
29%. That is the best estimate, in other words, of how much being assigned 
to the “immigrant aid” version of the problem as opposed to the “construction 
worker” version changes the probability that either a “Hierarchical 
Individualist” or an “Egalitarian Communitarian” member of the public will 
find a violation. The 0.95 level of confidence for that estimate is ± 9%.152 In 
Disclosure, the IPCI—the difference in the probability that either an 
“Egalitarian Individualist” or “Hierarchical Communitarian” member of the 
public will find a violation if assigned to the “pro-choice center” as opposed 
to “pro-life center” version—is 16% (± 9%). The average IPCI for a member 
of the public is 22% (± 6%) (Figure 7).153 
The regression model corroborates the inference that judges were not 
affected by identity-protective cognition. As is clear from the judge IPCI 
probability distributions (Figure 7), the predicted IPCI for judges was not 
 
150 For this purpose, we are treating as an “identity-protective cognition effect” a difference in 
probability of finding a violation in the direction corresponding to the hypothesized effect of the 
experimental manipulation. In Figure 7, differences in that direction have a positive value; 
differences in direction contrary to the hypothesized effect of identity-protective cognition, in 
contrast, have a negative value.  
151 See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective 
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1832-33 (2006); King, 
Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 148. 
152 All confidence intervals reported in the text hereafter will reflect a 0.95 level of confidence. 
153 Because each study problem constituted an indirect measure of an unobserved or latent 
disposition—the propensity to process information in a manner that reflects identity-protective 
cognition—the aggregated or “average” effect is more precise than either individual measure, and 
thus has a smaller standard error. See Rosenthal & Rubin, supra note 149. 
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different, statistically or practically, from zero in either Littering or 
Disclosure.154  
Moreover, the difference between the public and judge IPCIs in both 
problems was large and significant, statistically and practically, in both 
Littering (34%, ± 22%) and Disclosure (20%, ± 17%). The predicted average 
public IPCI exceeds the predicted judge IPCI by 27% (± 14%). The “null 
hypothesis”—that there is no difference in the vulnerability of judges and 
members of the public to identity-protective reasoning—can thus be 
“rejected.” 
c. Judges versus Members of the Public Using Bayesian Methods  
As an alternative to assessing the improbability of the “null hypothesis,” 
one can use Bayesian methods to assess the strength of the evidence in 
relation to competing hypothesized IPCIs.155 Under Bayes’ theorem the 
likelihood ratio reflects how much more consistent an observed outcome is 
with one hypothesis than a rival one. It is the factor in proportion to which 
one should adjust one’s assessment of the relative probability (expressed in 
odds) of one hypothesis in relation to the other.156 
Imagine, for example, that we are shown two opaque canvas bags, labeled 
“B1”and “B2,” each of which is filled with marbles (we use canvas bags for this 
example in anticipation of the reasonable concern that Bayes’ theorem might 
apply only to marble-filled urns). We are not told which is which, but one 
bag, it is stipulated, contains 75% red marbles and 25% blue, and the other 
75% blue and 25% red. We are instructed to “sample” the contents of the bags 
by drawing one marble from each, after which we should make our best 
estimate of the probability that B1 is the bag containing mostly blue marbles 
and B2 the one containing mostly red. We extract a blue marble from B1 and 
a red one from B2.  
Bayes’ Theorem furnishes logical instructions on how to use this “new 
evidence” to revise our estimates of the probability of the hypothesis that B1 
is the bag containing mostly blue marbles (and hence B2 mostly red). If we 
assume that that hypothesis is true, then the probability that we would have 
drawn a blue marble from B1 is 3/4 or 0.75, as is the probability that we would 
 
154 The negative values suggest that the “best estimate” of the effects of the judges’ cultural 
outlooks on their decision making were in fact the opposite from what one would expect if judges 
had been influenced by identity-protective cognition. 
155 See generally Rivka M. de Vries & Richard D. Morey, Bayesian Hypothesis Testing for Single-
Subject Designs, 18 PSYCHOL. METHODS 165 (2013); Goodman, supra note 140; John K. Kruschke, 
Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t Test, 142 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 573 (2013). 
156 See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 141. 
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have drawn a red marble from B2. The joint probability of these independent 
events—that is, the probability of the two occurring together, as they did—
is 3/4 x 3/4 or 9/16. If we assume that the hypothesis “B1 is the one that 
contains mostly blue marbles” is false, then the joint probability of drawing a 
blue marble from B1 followed by a red marble from B2 would be 1/4 x 1/4, or 
1/16. Other possible combinations of colors could have occurred, of course 
(indeed, there are four possible combinations for such a trial). But if we were 
to repeat this “experiment” over and over (with the marbles being replaced 
and the labels on the bags being randomly reassigned after each trial), then 
we would expect the sequence “blue, red” to occur nine times more often 
when the bag containing mostly blue marbles is the one labeled “B1” than 
when it is the bag labeled “B2.” Because “blue, red” is the outcome we 
observed in our trial, we should revise our estimate of the probability of the 
hypothesis “B1 contains mostly blue marbles” by a factor 9—from odds of 1:1 
(50%) to 9:1 (90%).  
We can use precisely the same logic to assess the relative probability of 
hypothesized judge and public IPCIs. In effect, one can imagine each subject 
type as an opaque vessel containing some propensity to engage in identity-
protective cognition. Although the strengths of those propensities—the 
subject types’ “true” IPCIs—are not amenable to direct inspection, we can 
sample observable manifestations of them by performing this study’s 
statutory interpretation experiment. Calculating the relative likelihood of the 
observed results under competing hypotheses, we can construct a likelihood 
ratio that conveys how much more consistent the evidence is with one 
hypothesized subject type IPCI than with another. 
Figure 8 illustrates the use of this method to test two competing 
hypotheses about the public’s “true” IPCI: that members of the public would 
be 25% more likely to find a violation when doing so is culturally affirming, 
and alternatively that they would be only 15% more likely to do so. To make 
the rival hypothesis commensurable with the study results, we can represent 
each as a probability distribution with the predicted IPCI as its mean and a 
standard error equivalent to the one observed in the experimental results. 
Within any one such distribution, the relative probability of alternative 
IPCIs (e.g., 15% and 25%) can be determined by assessing their relative 
“heights” on that particular curve.157 Likewise, the relative probability of 
observing any particular IPCI under alternative distributions can be 
 
157 The units that appear on the y-axis are in fact completely irrelevant for this purpose. 
Consistent with convention, we compare probability densities, which are the first derivative of (rate 
of change in) cumulative probability distribution associated with the logistic regression function 
that generates the underlying probabilities.  
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determined by comparing the ratio of the heights for the probability density 
distributions in question.158  
 
Figure 8: Assessing the Weight of the Evidence: Competing Hypotheses 
for Public IPCI 
 
Note: The weight of the evidence in relation to two hypotheses can be determined by deriving a 
likelihood ratio from the probability density distributions associated with those hypotheses. Here, 
probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the standard 
error (0.03) associated with the observed Public IPCI in the experiment. The probability of obtaining 
the observed experimental result is eight times greater under hypothesis 1 than hypothesis 2.  
 
The public IPCI was 22%. The probability of observing such a result (or 
any in close proximity to it) is eight times more likely under the more extreme 
“public IPCI = 25%” hypothesis than it is under the more modest “public 
IPCI = 15%” hypothesis (Figure 8).159 This is the Bayesian likelihood ratio, 
or the factor in proportion to which one should modify one’s assessment of 
the relative probability that the “true” public IPCI is 25% as opposed to 15%. 
 
158 See Steven N. Goodman, Toward Evidence-Based Medical Statistics. 2: The Bayes Factor, 130 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1005 (1999). 
159 See generally Goodman, supra note 140. 
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We will use the same process to assess the weight of four competing 
hypotheses about the vulnerability of judges to identity protective cognition. 
The first is that judges will be “unaffected” (IPCI = 0). This prediction, of 
course, appears similar to the “null hypothesis.” But whereas “null hypothesis 
testing” purports to specify only whether the null hypothesis can be rejected, 
Bayesian methods can be used to obtain a genuine assessment of the strength 
of the evidence in support of there being “no effect” if that is a genuine 
hypothesis of interest, as it is here.160 The remaining three hypotheses, the 
plausibility of which will be tested relative to the “IPCI = 0” hypothesis are 
that judges will be “just as affected as the public” (IPCI = 22%); that judges 
will be moderately affected (IPCI = 10%); and that judges will be affected to 
only a comparatively mild degree (IPCI = 5%).161 
The results are reflected in Figure 9. Not surprisingly, the experimental 
data are much more supportive of the first hypothesis—that judges would be 
unaffected by the experimental manipulation—than with the second—that 
they would be “as affected as much as the public.” Indeed, because the 
probability that we would have observed the actual experimental result if the 
latter hypothesis is true is astronomically low, there is little practical value in 
assigning a likelihood ratio to how much more strongly the evidence supports 
the hypothesis that judges were “unaffected” by the experimental 
manipulation. 
 
Figure 9: Judge IPCI: Evidentiary Weight of Experimental Data 
 
 
160 See Kruschke, supra note 155, at 577; Richard D. Morey & Jeffrey N. Rouder, Bayes Factor 
Approaches for Testing Interval Null Hypotheses, 16 PSYCHOL. METHODS 406 (2011). 
161 See generally Goodman, supra note 158. 
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Note: The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the 
standard error (0.06) associated with the observed Judge IPCI in the experiment. The horizontal 
line intersecting the probability distributions is the observed judge IPCI (-5%). 
 
Of course, members of the public were influenced by their cultural 
predispositions to a strikingly large extent. To learn that the evidence 
strongly disfavors the inference that judges are that biased does not in itself 
give us much insight into whether judges possess the capacity for impartial 
decisionmaking that their duties demand. It was precisely for that reason that 
less extreme IPCIs were also hypothesized. 
Even those predictions, however, proved to be less supported by the 
evidence than was the hypothesis that judges would be unaffected by identity-
protective reasoning. The evidence was twenty times more consistent with the 
“judge IPCI = 0” hypothesis than the “judge IPCI = 10%” hypothesis. The 
weight of the evidence was not as decided but still favored—by a factor of 
about three—the “judge IPCI = 0” hypothesis over the “judge IPCI = 5%” 
hypothesis (Figure 9). 
d. Lawyers and Law Students, Both Methods  
The simulated probability distributions for lawyers and law students are 
graphically represented in Figure 10. The average lawyer IPCI was neither 
practically nor meaningfully different from zero (2%, ± 14%). In addition, the 
difference between the lawyer and public IPCIs was 20% (± 16%). One can 
thus “reject” the “null hypothesis” that the difference in the magnitude of the 
lawyer and public responses to the experimental manipulation was zero.  
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Figure 10: Lawyers & Law Students: Estimated IPCI 
Note: Derived from Monte Carlo simulation based on regression model 3 in Table A1 and regression 
model 3, Table A2 in Appendix A. Density distributions reflect the predicted difference in the 
probability that a decisionmaker with a particular worldview (either “Hierarchical Individualist” or 
“Egalitarian Communitarian” in Littering or “Hierarchical Communitarian” or “Egalitarian 
Individualist” in Disclosure) will find a violation if experimentally assigned to one version of the 
problem versus the other.162 A positive value for the difference indicates a differential consistent 
with the influence of identity-protective cognition. 
 
The evidence for the students is more equivocal. In both problems, the 
predicted student IPCI was greater than zero, and on average it was 12% 
(± 14%). This effect—the difference in how likely a student decisionmaker is 
to find a violation when that outcome is identity-affirming rather than 
identity-denigrating—is not statistically significant at “p < 0.05”; it is 
significant at only “p = 0.10.” But the difference between the student and 
public IPCI’s was not statistically significant at p < 0.05 either (10%, ± 15%; 
p = 0.20). Accordingly, if one uses “null hypothesis testing” criteria, one can 
reject neither the hypothesis that students were unaffected by identity-
protective cognition nor the hypothesis that they were affected just as much 
as members of the public—who by this same mode of assessment can be deemed 
to have been strongly influenced by this same form of bias (22%, ± 6%). 
 
 
162 See generally King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, supra note 148. 
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Figure 11: Student IPCI: Evidentiary Weight of Experimental Data 
 
Note: The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the 
standard error (0.07) associated with the observed student IPCI in the experiment. The horizontal 
line intersecting the probability distributions is the observed student IPCI (12%). 
 
More information can be extracted from the results, however, if one 
computes the likelihood ratios for competing hypotheses about the size of the 
“true” student IPCI. Figure 11 indicates that the experimental evidence is 
very slightly—1.5 times—more consistent with the hypothesis that the “true” 
student IPCI is “as large as” the public IPCI that with the “student IPCI = 
0” hypothesis. However, the evidence is even more supportive of the “student 
IPCI = 10%” hypothesis, which is over two times more consistent with the 
evidence than is the “as big as the public” hypothesis. The “student IPCI = 
10%” hypothesis is also nearly twice as consistent with the evidence than is 
the “student IPCI = 5%” hypothesis. 
Again, the use of “null hypothesis testing” methods supported no 
particular inference about the impact of identity-protective cognition on 
student subjects. But using Bayesian methods to assess the weight of the 
evidence in relation to these competing hypotheses suggests the most 
supported one is that the students would be affected about half as much by 
the experimental manipulation as were members of the public.  
Figure 12 illustrates the use of this method to test competing hypotheses 
about the lawyer IPCI. The weight of the evidence against the hypothesis 
that lawyers will be affected as much as the public is quite strong: the “lawyer 
IPCI = 0” hypothesis is over 100 times more consistent with the evidence. 
The evidence also more strongly supports—by a factor of just over two—the 
“lawyer IPCI = 0” hypothesis over the “lawyer IPCI = 10%” hypothesis.  
On the final hypothesis—that lawyers would be 5% more likely to find a 
violation when such an outcome was culturally affirming rather than culturally 
denigrating—the evidence is effectively silent. Generating a likelihood ratio of 
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very close to one, the experimental results are effectively equally consistent 
with the “lawyer IPCI = 0” and “lawyer IPCI = 5%” hypotheses. 
 
Figure 12: Lawyer IPCI: Evidentiary Weight of Experimental Data 
Note: The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses were constructed using the 
standard error (0.07) associated with the observed lawyer IPCI in the experiment. The horizontal 
line intersecting the probability distributions is the observed lawyer IPCI (2%). 
e. Judges versus Lawyers  
Comparing Figures 9 and 12 reveals that the evidence supports the 
“unaffected” hypothesis relative to each of its rivals more strongly in the case 
of judges than in the case of lawyers. But it would be a mistake to infer on 
that basis that the evidence supports by a comparable margin the hypothesis 
that judges are more likely than lawyers to be unaffected by identity-
protective cognition by a substantial degree.  
Neither the judge IPCI (-5%, ± 12%) nor the lawyer IPCI (2%, ± 14%) is 
statistically or practically different from zero. If we model each rival to the 
“no effect” hypotheses as a mean or “most likely” value atop a bell-shaped 
probability density distribution, then the probability of observing the judge 
IPCI will be even more dramatically improbable than observing the lawyer 
IPCI within any of the relevant distributions.  
But the gap between the judge and lawyer IPCIs is itself relatively 
modest—8% (± 19%), a difference that also fails to satisfy the conventional 
“null hypothesis” level of statistical significance. Accordingly, the probability 
of observing both values when the hypothesized difference is relatively small 
should be greater than the probability of observing both when the 
hypothesized difference is relatively large. 
 
0
5.6
6
-.25 -.05 .25 .45
2.8
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3-15 .05 .15 .35
Identity protective cognition impact
H1: 
IPCI = 0
H2: 
IPCI = 0.22
H1: 
IPCI = 0
H3: 
IPCI = 0.10
observed data >100 x more
consistent with
IPCI = 0 than with IPCI = “as 
big as public”
observed data 2x more
consistent with IPCI = 0 
than with IPCI = 10%
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
5.2
H1: 
IPCI = 0
H4: 
IPCI = 0.05
observed data equally
consistent with IPCI = 0 as 
with IPCI = 5%
0
5.6
6
0
5.6
6
  
408 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 164: 349 
 
Figure 13: Judge–Lawyer IPCI Differential 
Note: The left-hand panel juxtaposes probability density distributions for predicted lawyer and judge 
IPCIs (see supra Figures 7 & 10). The probability distributions reflecting the indicated hypotheses 
were constructed using the standard error (0.10) associated with the observed difference in judge 
and lawyer IPCIs. 
 
This point is illustrated in Figure 13, which juxtaposes the probability dis-
tributions for two competing hypotheses about the size of the difference be-
tween the judge and lawyer IPCIs: 0% vs. 10%. The meager 1.2 likelihood 
ratio in favor of the latter hypothesis signifies that the evidence in support of 
it is only trivially greater than the evidence in support of the former “equal 
IPCI” hypothesis. 
B. Risk Perceptions  
As indicated, the subjects responded to a battery of items measuring their 
perceptions of various societal risks. These were combined to form separate 
“environmental risk” and “social deviancy risk” scales.163  
 
 
163 See supra Part III.  
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Figure 14: Societal Risk Concerns 
Note: The bars reflect standardized (z-score) means of indicated risk perceptions for subjects holding 
indicated worldviews (as determined by relationship of their scores to means on the Hierarchy–
Egalitarianism and Individualism–Communitarianism scales). Error bars reflect 0.95 level of 
confidence for “true mean.” 
 
Subject responses displayed the characteristic forms of variance associated 
with identity-protective cognition. Thus, subjects became less concerned 
with environmental risks, such as global warming and nuclear power, as they 
became more hierarchical and individualistic and more concerned with them 
as they became more egalitarian and communitarian (ΔM = 1.34, t-
statistic = 20.05, p < 0.01). Greater concern with social deviancy risks, such as 
legalization of marijuana and teen pregnancy, was associated with being more 
hierarchical and communitarian, whereas being more egalitarian and 
individualistic predicted less concern (ΔM = 0.33, t-statistic = 6.76, p < 0.01). 
These constellations of risk perceptions are consistent with reliance on 
cultural cognition, a form of motivated reasoning that consists of selectively 
crediting and discrediting information about societal risks in patterns that 
protect one’s standing in a cultural group for which membership is associated 
with the risk perceptions in question.164  
 
164 See generally Kahan & Braman, supra note 111; Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 125.  
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The same patterns of risk perceptions were readily observable in the 
judge, lawyer, and law student members of the sample (Figure 14). 
Multivariate testing corroborated that all subject types were culturally 
polarized to a substantial degree (Table A3). The size of the differences varied 
but not in patterns consistent with the inference that either legal practice or 
the experience of being a judge confers meaningful resistance to identity-
protective reasoning for judgments unrelated to legal decisionmaking 
(Appendix A, Figure A3).165  
V. TAKING STOCK 
A. So Are Judges Political? 
The aim of this study was to test whether legal reasoning on the part of 
judges displays the characteristics of identity-protective cognition. Because 
that dynamic predictably generates culturally or ideologically biased 
information processing, evidence that judges are vulnerable to identity-
protective reasoning would support the popular and scholarly indictment that 
judges—lower court ones and Supreme Court Justices alike—are mere 
“politicians in robes.”  
More concretely, the nature of the sample and the design of the study 
were self-consciously constructed to enable testing of four distinct 
hypotheses. The first was Universal Vulnerability or UV, which predicted 
that judges, lawyers, and law students would display the same vulnerability 
to identity-protective reasoning as members of the public. UV is the 
hypothesis associated with dominant scholarly accounts, both observational 
and experimental, of the impact of ideology on judicial decisionmaking. 
The results of the study were strongly at odds with UV. Both statutory 
interpretation problems excited strong evidence of identity-protective 
cognition—the form of biased information processing associated with 
political polarization—in members of the general public, but not in lawyers or 
judges. Neither judges nor lawyers displayed practically or statistically 
meaningful signs of being influenced by the cultural congeniality of the 
experimentally manipulated case outcomes.  
The second hypothesis was Identity-Protective Cognition Immunity 
(ICI): that legal training would imbue lawyers and judges with resistance to 
identity-protective cognition generally by virtue of its effect in strengthening 
critical reasoning abilities. This hypothesis, the vindication of which would 
have been contrary to existing research that suggests identity-protective 
 
165 See infra Appendix A. 
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cognition is in fact amplified by critical reasoning proficiency,166 was also not 
supported by the study. The societal risk perceptions of lawyers and judges 
(and law students, too) displayed the relationship to their cultural worldviews 
that is the signature of identity-protective reasoning on contested matters of 
public policy. 
The third hypothesis—Domain-Specific Immunity (DSI)—predicted 
exactly this pattern. The basis for DSI was the expectation that professional 
training and experience could be expected to instill in lawyers and judges 
habits of mind resistant to identity-protective cognition when performing the 
types of reasoning tasks characteristic of their profession—but not otherwise. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, judges and lawyers who were as divided as 
members of the public generally on risk issues like climate change and 
marijuana legalization displayed remarkably high degrees of convergence in 
their analysis of legal problems that provoked cultural polarization in 
members of the public. 167 
The final hypothesis—Acquired Neutrality (AN)—predicted that judges 
alone would display resistance to identity-protective reasoning. The basis for 
this hypothesis was the surmise that the experience of willfully engaging in 
neutral decisionmaking would endow judges with a distinctive ability to stifle 
unconscious motivations to conform their assessments of information to their 
defining group commitments.  
The weight of the evidence in support of rejecting various hypothesized 
degrees of vulnerability to identity-protective cognition was in fact 
consistently stronger in the case of the judges than the lawyers. But the 
evidence was amply strong in the lawyers’ case. It would seem odd, then, to 
conclude that the demonstrated neutrality of the judges in this study is 
attributable to the habitual exercise of their special duties rather than to the 
habits of mind associated with legal training and experience generally. 
The strength of the evidence for DSI in this study is strongly at odds with 
previous studies purporting to find that judges resort to “ideological 
considerations” when deciding cases. The conflict is most likely attributable 
to the methodological limitations present in the latter studies but self-
consciously corrected in this one. Observational studies, it has been pointed 
out, exaggerate the role of such influences by use of both biased samples—
 
166 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
167 This result is very much in keeping with the ones reported in Wistrich, Rachlinski & Guth-
rie, supra note 60. The “emotional” sensibilities that they view as “motivating” judges to reach dif-
ferent outcomes in cases involving “sympathetic” and “unsympathetic” parties can be understood as 
evincing a shared professional sensibility that guided ideologically diverse judges to converge on outcomes 
perfectly consistent with the governing legal provisions. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying 
text. 
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litigated cases, which consist disproportionately of ones likely to divide jurists 
inclined to agree notwithstanding ideological differences—and biased 
measures—outcome classifications that treat as “ideological” disagreements 
based on jurisprudential considerations intrinsic to the law itself.168 This 
study avoided these problems by use of an experimental design that 
manipulated the subjects’ motivations to decide a problem on the basis of 
cultural commitments extrinsic to the relevant legal rule. The experiment, 
moreover, was performed on actual judges. The finding that judges are not 
influenced by identity-protective cognition when ordinary members of the 
public (including law students) are underscores the mistake of treating the 
reasoning of the latter as a valid model of the reasoning of the former. 
While inconsistent with scholarship suggesting that judicial 
decisionmaking is “ideological,” the study results complement and extend 
other work showing that judges can be expected to display at least some 
measure of immunity to cognitive biases thought to interfere with the 
performance of their jobs.169 Because that scholarship has focused on biases 
characteristic of over-reliance on heuristic System 1 information processing, 
it has not furnished grounds one way or the other for believing that judges 
would be immune to identity-protective cognition, which research has shown 
is magnified, not mitigated, by proficiency in the forms of conscious, effortful 
System 2 information processing.170 Accordingly, the present study adds to the 
growing stock of valid empirical examinations of “how judges think.”171 
B. What About Law Students? 
For the law student participants in our study, the results were mixed. 
Overall, the evidence supports the conclusion that students were affected less 
by the experimental manipulation than were members of the public. 
Nevertheless, the evidence also suggests that it is likely students were affected 
enough to raise doubts about their capacity to decide cases in a manner 
uninfluenced by cultural commitments extrinsic to law: the evidence was 
more consistent than not with the inference that the students were at least 10 
percentage points more likely to find a violation when doing so suited rather 
than disappointed their cultural worldviews.  
 
168 Remarkably, some “ideology thesis” proponents use information on judges’ voting behavior 
to characterize judges as “liberal” or “conservative” and then use the resulting measures to “test” 
hypotheses about “ideological voting” by those judges in the very cases from which their “ideology” 
classifications or scores were derived. See EPSTEIN, POSNER & LANDES, supra note 5, 113-16 & n.13. 
169 See, e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 75, at 27-28. 
170 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
171 See generally Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 75. 
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That law students would not enjoy the same capacity to resist identity-
protective reasoning as judges and lawyers is not surprising and is consistent 
with the Domain-Specific Immunity hypothesis. Students enjoy an immature 
form of the professional judgment that fully trained and experienced lawyers 
possess. It stands to reason, then, that culturally diverse students would 
display less convergence in their assessment of culturally fraught legal 
problems.  
Indeed, our finding that students are less resistant to politically motivated 
reasoning than are judges and lawyers corroborates one important component 
of the Redding–Reppucci study and helps to put the full results of that study 
in perspective. As we did, Redding and Reppucci found that students, but 
not judges, were inclined to conform legal rulings—in their study, the 
admissibility of evidence on the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty—to 
their political outlooks.172  
Redding and Reppucci also found that both judges and students tended 
to resolve constitutional challenges to capital punishment in a manner 
consistent with their political values, regardless of whether the evidence 
challenged their prior views on capital punishment’s deterrent efficacy.173 But 
as we have explained,174 that legal issue itself requires judges to make 
normative judgments. Normative judgments, unsurprisingly, will vary across 
judges of differing political outlooks. Insofar as the role of those judgments 
in legal decisionmaking is intrinsic to law, however, it is not valid to treat any 
correlation between legal rulings of that sort and decisionmakers’ political 
outlooks as evidence of “politically” or “ideologically” biased reasoning.175 
For it to be important—indeed, for it to be analytically coherent—the 
claim that judges are “politically biased” requires demonstrating the 
responsiveness of their rulings to political outlooks extrinsic to the legal issues 
they are considering.176 The statutory interpretation rulings of the judges in 
our study were not responsive to such outlooks—just as the evidentiary 
rulings of the judges in the Redding–Reppucci study were not. That the legal 
reasoning of law students, in our study and theirs, were not immune to this 
bias furnishes reason to view both studies as evidence that professional 
judgment contributes to neutralizing identity-protective cognition on judicial 
decisionmaking. 
 
172 Redding & Reppucci, supra note 68, at 47-48. 
173 Id. at 43-49.  
174 See supra notes 30–35 & 72 and accompanying text.  
175 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 11, at 1945-48. 
176 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
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At the same time, we think it would be a mistake to treat as unimportant 
our finding that students displayed at least some degree of resistance to 
identity-protective cognition. Because they are likely to enjoy higher than 
average proficiency in critical reasoning, law students can in fact be expected 
to be more vulnerable, not less, to ideologically motivated reasoning.177 Indeed, 
the risk-perception responses of the student members of our sample displayed 
ample evidence of being affected by this form of information processing 
generally. Yet on one problem that plainly did culturally polarize ordinary 
members of the public, the students in our study were more likely to converge 
on the answer that lawyers and judges recognize as correct.  
The process of acquiring this species of professional judgment obviously 
does not end in law school. But our study suggests that it certainly begins 
there. 
C. Motivated Reasoning, Professional Judgment, and Political Conflict 
Using experimental methods, decision science has generated a rich 
empirical literature on professional judgment. Areas of investigation have 
included the interplay of unconscious and reflective modes of cognition in 
expert reasoning;178 the susceptibility and resistance of professionals to biases, 
in and out of domain;179 and one or another determinant of judgmental 
proficiency.180 
This study makes a contribution to this general body of literature as well. 
It is the first to examine whether and how professional judgment interacts 
with identity-protective reasoning.  
 
177 See Kahan, supra note 16, at 416-17. 
178 See, e.g., Bedard & Biggs, supra note 88 (studying hypothesis formation in accounting 
professionals); Marcum, supra note 89. 
179 See, e.g., Merim Bilalić, Robert Langner, Michael Erb & Wolfgang Grodd, Mechanisms and 
Neural Basis of Object and Pattern Recognition: A Study with Chess Experts, 139 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 728 (2010); Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of 
Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993) (describing the 
agreement effect of scientific judgments); Olga Kostopoulou, J. Edward Russo, Greg Keenan, 
Brendan C. Delaney, & Abdel Douiri, Information Distortion in Physicians’ Diagnostic Judgments, 32 
MED. DECISION MAKING 831 (2012); cf. Paul Slovic & John Monahan, Probability, Danger, and 
Coercion: A Study of Risk Perception and Decision Making in Mental Health Law, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 
49 (1995). 
180 See, e.g., PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? 
HOW CAN WE KNOW? (2005) (discussing means of measuring expertise in politics); Philip M. 
Fernbach, Adam Darlow & Steven A. Sloman, Neglect of Alternative Causes in Predictive but Not 
Diagnostic Reasoning, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 329, 334 (2010); Paul Slovic, John Monahan & Donald G. 
MacGregor, Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases, 
Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
271 (2000). 
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It is not particularly surprising that this topic has not received scholarly 
attention. The impact of identity-protective reasoning is not nearly so 
significant for understanding and perfecting professional judgment as are the 
effects of the various other cognitive dynamics featured in the decision 
science literature. Recognizing that auditors, say, have a stake in forming 
perceptions of societal risk that protect their status in their cultural groups is 
unlikely to contribute much to assessing the role that prototypical reasoning 
plays in their detection of irregularities in financial records.181 The prospect 
that doctors will misdiagnose a disease because of base-rate neglect or 
coherence-based reasoning, likewise, is more critical to assessing the 
proficiency of physicians than is figuring out if they are likely to be 
unconsciously motivated to selectively credit and dismiss data on climate 
change in a manner that reflects their worldviews. The relevance of identity-
protective cognition to professional judgment is much more conspicuous in 
law, where assuring that facts are determined, and legal rules administered, 
in a manner that is neutral as between competing cultural understandings of 
the best way to live is the very form of expertise that a judge is required to 
exercise. 
But there is at least one other group of experts whose vulnerability to 
identity-protective cognition has become an issue of speculation: scientists 
who investigate risks and related facts that excite cultural polarization. 
Sensibly, citizens tend to treat “scientific consensus” on environmental risk 
and other highly technical matters as a reliable normative guide for 
decisionmaking, collective and individual.182 But what makes it sensible for 
them to do so is that the method of inquiry that scientists themselves use 
does not afford existing “scientific consensus” any particular weight. On the 
contrary, the entitlement of any previously supported proposition to 
continued assent is, for science, conditional on its permanent amenability to 
reexamination and revision in light of new evidence.183  
If, then, there were reason to believe that scientists themselves were being 
unconsciously motivated to discount evidence challenging “consensus” 
positions on issues like climate change, say, or nuclear power or genetically 
modified foods, by their cultural outlooks, that would be a reason for treating 
 
181 Cf. Bedard & Biggs, supra note 88 (showing that hypothesis creation in auditor analysis is 
not related to an auditor’s particular worldview). 
182 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith, & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of 
Scientific Consensus, 14 J. RISK RES. 147, 147 (2011) (noting that both sides in culturally polarizing 
debates over societal risks understand their group’s position to be consistent with “scientific 
consensus”—but disagree about what “scientific consensus” is as a result of identity-protective 
cognition). 
183 See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40 (1959). 
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apparent scientific-consensus positions as a less reliable guide for 
decisionmaking. Various commentators, including some scientists, now assert 
that identity-protective reasoning has pervasively distorted the findings of 
climate scientists, making their conclusions, as reflected in reports like those 
issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,184 the National 
Academy of Sciences,185 and the Royal Society,186 unreliable.187 
Obviously, the best way to test this claim is by conducting valid empirical 
studies of the scientists whose findings on risk or other policy-relevant facts 
are being challenged on this basis. But we believe our study, although 
confined to judges and lawyers, furnishes at least some evidence for 
discounting the likelihood of the hypothesis that climate scientists or other 
comparable experts are being influenced by identity-protective reasoning. 
The reason is the connection between our study results and the theory of 
professional judgment on which the study was founded. 
As explained,188 the theoretical basis for our study design and hypotheses 
was the account of professional judgment most conspicuously associated with 
the work of Howard Margolis. Margolis treats professional judgment as 
consisting of the acquisition of specialized prototypes that enable those 
possessing the relevant form of expertise to converge on the recognition of 
phenomena of consequence to their special decisionmaking responsibilities.  
Margolis used this account of professional judgment among scientists to 
help explain lay–expert conflicts over environmental risk. Nonexperts 
necessarily lack the expert prototypes that figure in expert pattern 
recognition. Nevertheless, members of the public possess other forms of 
prototypes—ones consisting of what expert judgments look like—that help them 
to recognize “who knows what about what.” Their adroit use of these 
prototypes, through the cognitive process of pattern recognition, enables 
them to reliably converge on what experts know, and thus to get the benefit 
of it for their own decisionmaking, despite their inability to corroborate (or 
even genuinely comprehend) that knowledge for themselves. Nevertheless, 
in Margolis’s scheme, the bridging function that these “expertise prototypes” 
play in connecting lay judgments to expert ones can be disrupted. Such 
 
184 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT 
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2013). 
185 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE (2008). 
186 See, e.g., ROYAL SOCIETY, PREVENTING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE (2009). 
187 See, e.g., Judith Curry, Scientists and Motivated Reasoning, CLIMATE ETC. (Aug. 20, 2013), 
http://judithcurry.com/2013/08/20/scientists-and-motivated-reasoning [http://perma.cc/MMA7-KVKF]. 
188 See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
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sources of disruption create fissures between expert and lay judgment and 
resulting forms of public conflict over environmental risk. 
Identity-protective cognition can be understood to be a disrupting 
influence of this character. When a fact subject to expert judgment (Is the 
earth heating up and are humans causing that? Does permitting citizens to 
carry handguns in public make crime rates go up or down? Does the HPV 
vaccine protect adolescent girls from a cancer-causing disease—or lull them 
into sexual promiscuity that increases their risk of pregnancy and other 
STDs?) becomes entangled in antagonistic cultural meanings, positions on 
that fact can become transformed into badges of membership in and loyalty 
to opposing groups. At that point the stake people have in protecting their 
status in their group will compete with, and likely overwhelm, the one they 
have in forming perceptions that align with expert judgments.189 
As we have noted,190 there is a striking affinity between the account 
Margolis gives of pattern recognition in expert judgment among scientists 
and other professionals and Karl Llewellyn’s account of “situation sense” as a 
professionalized recognition capacity that enables lawyers and judges to 
converge on appropriate legal outcomes despite the indeterminacy of formal 
legal rules. We would surmise, based on this study and previous ones,191 a 
parallel account of public conflict over judicial decisions.  
Lacking lawyers’ “situation sense,” members of the public will not reliably 
be able to make sense of the application of legal rules. But members of the 
public will presumably have acquired lay prototypes that enable them, most 
of the time anyway, to recognize the validity of legal decisions despite their 
own inability to verify their correctness or comprehend their relationship to 
relevant sources of legal authority.  
But just like their capacity to recognize the validity of scientific expert 
judgments, the public’s capacity to recognize the validity of expert legal 
determinations will be vulnerable to conditions that excite identity-protective 
reasoning. When that happens, culturally diverse citizens will experience 
disagreement and conflict over legal determinations that do not generate such 
disagreement among legal decisionmakers.192 
This was the basic theoretical account that informed our study. It was the 
basis for our prediction that judges, as experts possessing professional 
 
189 See Dan Kahan, Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change, 488 NATURE 255 (2012). 
190 See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
191 See generally Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 46 (studying perceptions of a police 
chase, and finding that differences in cultural and social groups can have significant effects on 
individuals’ perceptions); Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans & Rachlinski, supra note 46 (showing 
evidence for cultural cognition affecting individual perceptions of the speech–conduct distinction). 
192 See generally Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9. 
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judgment, would be largely immune to identity-protective cognition when 
making in-domain decisions. By accessing their stock of shared prototypes, 
judges and lawyers could be expected to reliably attend only to the legally 
pertinent aspects of controversies and disregard the impertinent ones that 
predictably generate identity-protective cognition in members of the 
public—and thus resist cultural polarization themselves in their expert 
determinations. That is exactly the result we found in this study. 
Because this result was derived from and corroborates a more general 
account of the relationship between identity-protective reasoning and 
professional judgment, it seems reasonable to imagine that the same 
relationship between the two would be observed among other types of 
experts, including scientists studying climate change and other societal risks. 
On this account, public conflict over climate change and similar issues reflects 
a reasoning distortion peculiar to those who lack access to the prototypes or 
patterns that enable experts to see how particular problems should be solved. 
But since the experts do possess access to those prototypes, their reasoning, 
one would predict, is immune to the same form of disruption when they are 
making in-domain decisions. This is the basis for our conclusion that the 
current study furnishes reason for discounting the assertion that scientists 
and other risk-assessment experts should be distrusted because of their 
vulnerability to identity-protective cognition. 
Discount does not mean dismiss, however. Any judgment anyone forms 
on the basis of this study would obviously be subject to revision on the basis 
of evidence of even stronger probative value—the strongest, again, being the 
results of a study of the relevant class of professionals. 193 
At a minimum, though, this study shows that existing studies of the 
impact of identity-protective cognition on members of the public have no 
probative value in assessing whether the in-domain judgments of climate 
scientists or other risk-assessment professionals are being distorted by this 
form of bias. Generalizing from studies of members of the public to these 
experts would reflect the same question-begging mistake as generalizing from 
such studies to judges. The results of this study help illustrate that those who 
relied on experiments involving general-public samples to infer that judges 
 
193  Cf. Toby Bolsen, James N. Druckman & Fay Lomax Cook, Citizens’, Scientists’, and Policy 
Advisors’ Beliefs About Global Warming, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOCIAL SCI., March 2015, at 
271 (reporting data suggesting that scientists are less culturally polarized than members of public on 
climate change); J. S. Carlton, Rebecca Perry-Hill, Matthew Huber & Linda S. Prokopy, The 
Climate Change Consensus Extends Beyond Climate Scientists, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/10/9/ 094025/ pdf [http://perma.cc/L246-
CBEE] (same). 
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are influenced by identity-protective cognition were making a mistake.194 
Those who rely on how members of the public reason to draw inferences 
about the in-domain judgments of scientists are making one, too. 
Our study implies, though, that it probably isn’t a mistake to study lawyers 
if one wants to learn more about how judges think. Obviously, identity-
protective reasoning is only one cognitive dynamic of interest for those 
engaged in examining how general mechanisms of information processing 
interact with judicial habits of mind. It is arguably the one, though, that raises 
the most serious questions about the validity of using samples of lawyers to 
do so: lawyers and judges both engage in legal reasoning, but only judges have 
real-world experience making legal decisions that can threaten their own and 
others’ cultural identities. Thus, our finding that the responses of judges and 
lawyers were highly convergent with one another’s—and highly divergent 
with those of members of the public and even those of law students—
furnishes grounds for confidence that studies of lawyers can validly be used 
to model how judges will perform in reasoning tasks that invoke the form of 
professional judgment they share. 
D. The “Neutrality Communication Problem” 
We have suggested that the results of this study are relevant to the issue 
of how identity-protective cognition might affect expert scientists. We now 
want to explain how the contribution that identity-protective cognition 
makes to conflicts over policy-relevant science can be used to highlight the 
practical significance of our study results for the administration of justice. 
There is an obvious sense in which the results of this study can be 
understood as good news for the justice system. The perception that judges 
are “just politicians in robes” is, as we noted, commonplace. The popular view 
that judges decide cases on the basis of political or cultural commitments 
extrinsic to law is both understandable and distressing. Yet in an experiment 
designed to avoid methodological limitations associated with studies that 
have purported to corroborate this anxiety, we found evidence that judges of 
diverse cultural outlooks can be expected to converge on results in cases that 
 
194 See supra Section I.A. This study also underscores the unreliability of treating imaginative 
extrapolation from decision-science research involving the general public as a valid method for 
determining the vulnerability of judges to other biases that might constrain their effectiveness in 
performing tasks such as applying rules of evidence. This method is useful for generating hypotheses 
worthy of testing. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 16 (2006) (discussing whether judges should limit themselves to the same evidence 
as juries, and arguing that testing should be done to determine whether judges fall prey to the same 
problems of bias that juries do). But when held forth as an “explanation” supported by “scientific 
evidence,” this form of exposition confuses story-telling plausibility with empirical proof.  
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predictably divide the public. Their job is to decide those sorts of cases 
neutrally, and our evidence supports the inference that they have both the 
capacity and disposition to carry it out. 
That such a result defies public perceptions should not come as any sort 
of surprise. Numerous studies have found that members of the general public 
themselves can be expected to conform their assessments of evidence and 
their interpretation of rules to the stake they have in legal outcomes that 
affirm the status of their groups and their own standing within them.195 These 
studies, we have emphasized, are not a reliable basis for drawing inferences 
about the in-domain reasoning processes of judges. But the one sort of 
inference that they do support is that members of the public can be expected 
to perceive judges to be biased in cases the outcomes of which are invested 
with antagonistic cultural meanings even when the outcomes of those cases 
reflect neutral decisionmaking.196  
That conclusion is, in fact, the bad news associated with our study results: 
the reliable convergence of culturally diverse judges on genuinely neutral 
outcomes has no connection at all to how untrained members of the public 
perceive the neutrality of those judges’ decisions. Again, because citizens lack 
the elements of professional judgment—the “situation sense”—that lawyers 
and judges acquire through their training and experience, citizens do not have 
the capacity to discern those aspects of the case and the governing legal rules 
pertinent to assessing the neutrality or validity of judicial resolutions of them. 
On the contrary, in precisely those cases in which public anxiety about the 
cultural neutrality of the law is likely to be highest, identity-protective 
cognition will predictably disable members of the public from using their 
usually reliable lay prototypes of valid decisionmaking to assess cases 
outcomes. In that circumstance, no matter how expertly and impartially 
judges decide, the sense of the public—or at least those who belong to the 
cultural group whose identity is denigrated by the decision—will be disposed 
to see judges’ decisions as “politically biased.”197 
This problem is exactly parallel to the one that scientists face when 
empirical issues on which they possess expertise become entangled in 
culturally contested meanings. Obviously, doing valid science does not in 
itself communicate the validity of scientific research: people lack the expertise 
to see validity for themselves; they must rely on cues and processes that help 
 
195 See generally Sood, supra note 12. 
196 See Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9, at 59-60; Kahan, Hoffman, Braman, Evans, & 
Rachlinski, supra note 46, at 892-93. 
197 See Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, supra note 9, at 36-37. 
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them to reliably recognize who knows what about what.198 The capacity of 
members of the public to interpret those cues is compromised when 
propositions of risk or fact become symbols of the status of competing 
cultural groups.199 In that sort of “polluted science-communication 
environment,”200 just doing valid science—including the part of valid science 
that consists of communicating validity to other scientists—will do nothing to 
silence public confusion and agitation. 
Fixing this science communication problem is the aim of a new science of 
science communication.201 This subdivision of decision science uses empirical 
methods to identify the various dynamics that enable people to recognize as 
valid scientific insights that they could never verify for themselves. It also 
aims to understand, empirically, how those processes can be disrupted, and 
how society can effectively preempt such disruptions and counteract them 
when strategies of prevention fail. 
Exploiting the benefits of the science of science communication will 
demand appropriate adjustments to myriad institutional practices. The sorts 
of conscious interventions necessary to protect the science communication 
environment from contamination are not self-executing. An integral part of 
the science of science communication, then, is to identify programs of 
implementation that appropriately reconfigure the processes for science-
informed policymaking, the norms of science-generating and -consuming 
professions, and the structure of university training of scientists and public-
policymaking professionals. 
The law has a similar communication problem. Doing and communicating 
neutral decisionmaking are as different from one another as doing and 
communicating valid science. Just as solving the science communication 
problem demands scientific knowledge and appropriate institutional reforms, 
so solving the law’s neutrality communication problem will require 
appropriate acquisition and use of empirical knowledge of a sort aimed at 
expanding understanding of how people come to recognize the neutrality of 
the law and what law should do to make its neutrality fully recognizable. 
There is one critical difference, however, between the science 
communication problem and the neutrality communication problem. Unlike 
scientists, judges are expected both to make valid decisions and communicate 
the validity of their work to the public. It is widely recognized that the 
 
198 See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 8-9, 30, 36 (2d ed. 1965) (criticizing British sensory empiricism, which 
posited that the only valid currency of justified belief is personal observation). 
199 See Dan M. Kahan, A Risky Science Communication Environment for Vaccines, 342 SCI. 53, 53 (2013). 
200 Dan M. Kahan, Why We Are Poles Apart on Climate Change, 488 NATURE 255, 255 (2012). 
201 Kahan, supra note 78. 
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experience of liberal neutrality in law depends on the public’s confidence that 
the law is genuinely impartial. The practice of reason giving reflected in 
judicial opinions is understood to be intrinsic to the rule of law precisely 
because public assurance of the law’s neutrality depends on their access to a 
reasoned account of the neutral, impartial grounds for courts’ decisions.  
The legal profession is doing well, our study suggests, in equipping judges 
to be neutral decisionmakers. But the very ubiquity and persistence of 
conflict over whether judges are in fact deciding cases on neutral grounds is 
a testament to how little the profession knows, and how poorly equipped its 
members are, to communicate the neutrality of the law. That deficit in lawyers’ 
“situation sense” is itself a barrier to citizens’ enjoyment of the value that 
neutral judicial decisionmaking confers on them.  
CONCLUSION 
The motivations for conducting the study described in this Article were 
two. The first, narrower and more immediate one was to examine whether 
judicial decisionmaking is “ideologically biased.” The results of the study, 
which was designed to remedy methodological defects that prevent drawing 
valid inferences from existing studies, supply reason to discount the pervasive 
claim that judges are “politicians in robes.”  
The second, more general, and much more generally important, aim was 
to demonstrate the need for making judging an evidence-based profession. 
Like other experts, judges are endowed with expert professional judgment—
“situation sense,” in Llewellyn’s terms. In law no more than in any other 
profession, the use of empirical methods cannot plausibly be viewed as an 
alternative to either the role of shared experience in generating professional 
judgment or the successful acquisition and proficient use of such judgment 
by individual practitioners.  
But also like the professional judgment of all other manner of experts, the 
suitability of lawyers’ “situation sense” for the decisionmaking task that they 
must perform inevitably depends on its being informed by empirical facts, the 
nature and significance of which will evade confident detection by casual 
reflection. The disciplined methods of observation, measurement, and 
inference that are distinctive of science furnish the most reliable basis—the 
only reliable basis—for determining what those facts are. The legal profession 
comprises norms of collective self-reflection and -assessment that can be 
expected to instill in their members the habits of mind and the dispositions 
necessary to solve the neutrality communication problem and like challenges, 
but only if those processes are informed by valid understandings of how the 
world actually works. 
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Perfecting the profession of doing justice thus depends on the advent of a 
new science of judging.202  
 
202 See Kahan, Cognition of Law, supra note 9; Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, 
supra note 17, at 58-71. 
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APPENDIX A. REGRESSION MODELS 
A. Statutory Interpretation Problems 
The hypotheses relating to the impact of identity-protective cognition on 
the legal reasoning of the different subject types were tested with multivariate 
analyses. The models for Littering and Disclosure appear in Table A1 and 
Table A2, respectively. Each model contains predictors for the problem 
version (“imm” = 1 for assignment to “immigrant aid,” “imm” = 0 for 
assignment to “construction worker”; “pro-life” = 1 for assignment to “pro-
life center,” = 0 for assignment for “pro-choice center”); for subject type 
(dummy coded with member of the public as reference category); the 
continuous cultural worldview measures (“hfac” for hierarchy–egalitarianism, 
and “ifac” for individualism–communitarianism), each of which is centered 
at 0; and appropriate cross-product interaction terms that measure the 
interaction of the cultural worldviews and experimental assignments 
separately for each subject type. Predictors are added in groups to promote 
more ready interpretation of the regression output.  
1. Littering Problem  
Models 1 and 2 of Table A1 add predictors for assignment to the 
“immigrant aid” version of Littering and for cultural worldviews and 
corresponding cross-product interactions, respectively. The positive sign of 
the coefficient for “imm” (b = 0.33, p < 0.01) indicates that for the subjects 
considered as a whole the likelihood of finding a violation was higher in the 
“immigrant aid” than in the “construction worker” version of the problem. 
The positive coefficients for the two cross-product interaction terms in Model 
2—“hfac_x_imm” (b = -0.50, p < 0.01) and “ifac_x_imm” (b = 0.26, 
p < 0.05)—indicate that the relative probability of finding a violation in the 
“immigrant aid” version as opposed to the “construction worker” version 
increased as subjects became more hierarchical and individualistic; 
correspondingly, the relative probability of finding a violation in that version 
of the problem as opposed to the “construction worker” version decreased as 
subjects became more egalitarian and communitarian. Because Models 1 and 
2 do not include predictors relating to the types of subjects, they should be 
interpreted as effects for subjects “on average.” 
The predictors added to Model 3 account for differences between the re-
sponses of the various subject types. The substantial improvement in the fit 
of the Model (ΔLR χ2 = 143.3(18), p < 0.01) supports the inference that in 
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fact the predictors in Model 2 do not operate uniformly across members of 
the public, law students, lawyers, and judges.  
 
Table A1: Multivariate Regression Analysis for Littering 
 
Model 1 2 3 
Imm 0.33 (3.18) 0.34 (3.26) 0.27 (1.69) 
Hfac   -0.08 (-1.12) -0.34 (-3.41) 
Ifac   0.1 (0.09) -0.29 (-2.81) 
hfac_x_imm  0.50 (4.65) 0.77 (5.32) 
ifac_x_imm  0.26 (2.42) 0.46 (3.02) 
student     -0.66 (-2.95) 
lawyer     -1.32 (-4.24) 
Judge     -1.59 (-5.52) 
student_x_imm     0.10 (0.31) 
lawyer_x_imm    -0.01 (-0.01) 
judge_x_imm    -0.01 (-0.04) 
hfac_x_student    0.55 (2.30) 
hfac_x_lawyer    -0.02 (-0.05) 
hfac_x_judge    0.54 (1.94) 
ifac_x_student    0.19 (0.93) 
ifac_x_judge    0.49 (1.83) 
ifac_x_lawyer    0.36 (1.17) 
student_x_hfac_x_imm   -0.45 (-1.32) 
student_x_ifac_x_imm   -0.42 (-1.32) 
lawyer_x_hfac_x_imm    -0.74 (-1.59) 
lawer_ifac_x_imm    -0.47 (-1.21) 
judge_x_hfac_x_imm   -0.91 (-2.45) 
judge_x_ifac_x_imm -0.63 (-1.59) 
LR χ2 10.1(1) 53.2(5) 196.5(23)
ΔLR χ2  43.0(4) 143.3(18)
 
Note: N = 1502. Outcome variable is ruling (1 = violation, 0 = no violation). Predictor estimates are 
logit coefficients with z-test statistic indicated parenthetically. Bolded typeface indicates predictor 
coefficient, model LR χ2, or incremental change in model LR χ2 is significant at p < 0.05. Listwise 
deletion for missing data. 
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It is readily apparent from Model 3 that members of the public were more 
inclined to find a violation in the “construction worker” version than were 
other types of subjects. The predictors for being a student (b = -.66, p < 0.01), 
a lawyer (b = -1.32, p < 0.01), and a judge (b = -1.59, p < 0.01) reflect how being 
the indicated type of subject as opposed to being a member of the public 
influences the probability of finding a violation in the “construction worker” 
version of the problem, when cultural worldviews are “controlled for” (i.e., 
when the predictor values for hfac and ifac are set at their mean value, 0). 
The coefficients for each of those predictors are negative, indicating that 
members of the public, on average, are more inclined to find a violation in 
the “construction worker” version of the problem than the other subject 
types.  
The coefficient for “imm” now reflects how much more likely a member 
of the public is to find a violation in “immigrant aid” than in “construction 
worker” when that member of the public is “average” in cultural worldview. 
The sign of that predictor is positive (b = 0.27), implying that a member of 
the public is still more inclined to find a violation in the “immigrant aid” 
version, although this propensity is, for what it is worth, only “marginally 
significant” (p = 0.09). 
Also readily apparent from the output of Model 3 is the impact that 
cultural outlooks have on members of the public. The coefficients for both 
“hfac” (b = -0.34, p < 0.01) and “ifac” (b = -0.29, p < 0.01), are negative, and 
those for “hfac_x_imm” (b = 0.77, p < 0.01), and “ifac_x_imm” (b = 0.46, 
p < 0.01), are both positive. These results reflect the strong impact—visible 
in the summary data (Figure 5)—that members of the public were inclined 
to polarize along the lines consistent with the predicted impact of identity-
protective cognition: that is, as they became more hierarchical and 
individualistic, members of the public became more inclined to find a 
violation in the “immigration-aid” version and less so in the “construction 
worker” version; as they became more egalitarian and communitarian, they 
displayed the opposite decisionmaking tendency. 
The remaining information in the regression is less readily accessible. 
Figuring out how much more or less a judge is affected by his cultural 
outlooks in either the “immigrant aid” or “construction worker” version of 
the problem than is a member of the public or a law student, or a law student 
is than a lawyer, or a lawyer than a member of the public or a judge requires 
adding appropriate combinations of Model 3 predictors. It is the sign and 
magnitude of those sums and not the sign and magnitude of individual 
predictor coefficients that must thus be examined to assess the competing 
study hypotheses. 
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Figure A1: Simulated Probabilities of Finding a Violation in Littering 
Note: Figure A1 is derived from a Monte Carlo simulation based on regression Model 3, Table A1. 
Predictors for cultural worldviews set at +1 for both hierarchy and individualism and -1 for both in 
the case of “Hierarchical Individualist” (“HI”) and “Egalitarian Communitarian” (“EC”) 
decisionmakers, respectively. The curves reflect the probability density distribution for the 
predicted probability that the indicated subject type will find a violation in the indicated version of 
the problem. The most likely predicted outcome is the probability corresponding to the apex of the 
curve; probabilities higher or lower become progressively smaller as one approaches the values at 
the extreme tails of the curve. 
 
Statistical simulation furnishes the most straightforward and reliable 
means of making the relevant comparisons.203 Figure A1 displays simulated 
probability distributions for each of the relevant combination of subject 
types, worldviews, and experimental assignments. The distributions reflect 
 
203 See GELMAN & HILL, supra note 146, at 137-51; King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 148, 
at 351-53 (explaining that simulation is preferable to analytical methods because, among other things, 
it “can provide accurate answers even when no analytical solutions exist”). 
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the entire multivariate normal distribution for the regression model estimates 
of the predicted probabilities associated with relevant combinations of 
predictors.204  
Based on the simulated values, the predicted probability that a member 
of the public will find that the defendants committed a violation in the 
“immigrant aid” version of the problem is 28% higher (± 14%) if that member 
of the public has moderately hierarchical and individualistic values than if 
that individual has moderately egalitarian and communitarian ones. By the 
same token, the predicted probability that a member of the public will find 
that the defendants committed a violation in the “construction worker” 
version of the problem is 30% higher (± 12%) if that member of the public has 
moderately egalitarian and communitarian values than if that individual has 
moderately hierarchical and individualistic ones.  
The interaction of the experimental assignment with the cultural 
worldviews of student decisionmakers is less dramatic but still evinces modest 
effects consistent with identity-protective cognition. The biggest impact is 
on a Hierarchical Individualist student, whose predicted probability of 
finding a violation is 17% higher (± 28%) in the “construction worker” version 
than in the “immigrant aid” version. The difference is not statistically 
significant, however, at the conventional p < 0.05 level. 
For lawyer and judge decisionmakers, in contrast, the impacts are 
inconsistent with identity-protective cognition. Indeed, whether an 
Egalitarian Communitarian decisionmaker is a lawyer or a judge, the 
predicted probability that he or she will find a violation in the “immigrant 
aid” version is higher than it is in the “construction worker” version. If that 
decisionmaker is a lawyer, the probability that he or she will find a violation 
in the “immigrant aid” worker version is lower if the decisionmaker is a 
Hierarchical Individualist than if the decisionmaker is an Egalitarian 
Communitarian. These patterns are contrary to the ones associated with 
identity-protective cognition, although the magnitudes of all these effects 
differ by an amount that is neither practically nor statistically significant. 
 
  
 
204 See King, Tomz & Wittenberg, supra note 148, at 349. 
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Table A2: Multivariate Regression Analysis for Disclosure 
Model 1 2 3 
pro-life 0.08 (-0.70) 0.10 (0.91) 0.04 (0.25) 
Hfac   -0.10 (-1.30) 0.11 (1.19) 
Ifac   -0.09 (-1.12) -0.07 (-0.72) 
hfac_x_pro-life  -0.29 (-2.64) -0.39 (-2.80) 
ifac_x_pro-life  0.22 (2.01) 0.26 (1.78) 
Student    1.03 (4.22) 
Lawyer    1.48 (5.74) 
Judge    1.47 (4.78) 
student_x_pro-life   0.12 (0.32) 
lawyer_x_pro-life   0.17 (0.38) 
judge_x_pro-life   -0.12 (-0.32) 
hfac_x_student   -0.27 (-1.11) 
hfac_x_lawyer   -0.19 (-0.58) 
hfac_x_judge   -0.15 (-0.54) 
ifac_x_student   -0.16 (-0.72) 
ifac_x_judge   0.00 (-0.01) 
ifac_x_lawyer   0.13 (0.43) 
student_x_hfac_x_pro-life  0.11 (0.29) 
student_x_ifac_x_pro-life  0.31 (0.86) 
lawyer_x_hfac   -0.09 (-0.17) 
lawer_ifac_x_pro-life   -0.35 (-0.77) 
judge_x_hfac_x_pro-life  0.61 (1.51) 
judge_x_ifac_x_pro-life -0.33 (-0.82) 
LR χ2 0.5(1) 31.1(5) 182.4(23) 
ΔLR χ2 30.1(4) 151.3(18) 
 
Note: N = 1472. Outcome variable is ruling (1 = violation, 0 = no violation). Predictor estimates are 
logit coefficients with z-test statistic indicated parenthetically. Bolded typeface indicates predictor 
coefficient, model LR χ2, or incremental change in model LR χ2 is significant at p < 0.05. Listwise 
deletion for missing data. 
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2. Disclosure Problem 
Table A2 presents the regression analyses for subject responses to the 
Disclosure problem. The coefficient for “pro-life” in Model 1 (b = 0.08, 
p = 0.80) is only trivially different from zero, implying that, overall, subjects 
were not meaningfully more likely to find a violation in the “pro-life center” 
version than the “pro-choice center” version. 
 
Figure A2: Simulated Probabilities of Finding a Violation in Disclosure 
 
 
Note: The figure is derived from a Monte Carlo simulation based on Regression Model 3, Table A2. 
Predictors for cultural worldviews set at +1 for hierarchy and -1 for individualism and -1 for hierarchy 
and +1 for individualism in the case of Hierarchical Communitarian (“HC”) and Egalitarian 
Individualist (“EI”) decisionmakers, respectively. The curves reflect the probability density 
distribution for the predicted probability that the indicated subject type will find a violation in the 
indicated version of the problem. The most likely predicted outcome is the probability 
corresponding to the apex of the curve; probabilities higher or lower become progressively smaller 
as one approaches the values at the extreme tails of the curve. 
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Model 2 adds predictors for cultural worldviews. The negative coefficient 
for “hfac_x_pro-life” (b = 0.29, p < 0.01) and the positive one for “ifac_x_pro-
life” (b = .22, p < 0.05) indicate that, for the sample as a whole, subjects 
became more disposed to find a violation in the “pro-life center” version 
relative to the “pro-choice center” version as their outlooks became more 
egalitarian and individualistic and, correspondingly, more disposed to find a 
violation in the “pro-choice center” relative to the “pro-life center” version as 
their outlooks became more hierarchical and communitarian. These patterns 
are again consistent with the predicted influence of identity-protective 
cognition. 
It is apparent from Model 3 that students (b = 1.03, p < 0.01), lawyers 
(b = 1.48, p < 0.01), and judges (b = 1.47, p < 0.01) were all more disposed to 
find a violation in the “pro-choice center” version than were members of the 
public. But again, simulating predicted probabilities is the most 
straightforward way to extract from the model information relevant to the 
study hypotheses (Figure A2).  
The effects are less dramatic than in Littering, but the simulated values 
again support the inference of identity-protective cognition in the case of 
members of the public. A moderately egalitarian and individualistic member 
of the public is 17% (± 13) more likely to find a violation in the “pro-life 
center” version than in the “pro-choice version” of the problem, whereas a 
moderately hierarchical communitarian individual is 15% (± 10) less likely to 
do so.  
The simulated probabilities likewise suggest that identity-protective 
cognition influenced the reasoning of the students. An egalitarian 
individualist student decisionmaker, for example, is 15% (± 13) more likely to 
find a violation in the pro-life center version than in the pro-choice center 
version.  
Again, the effects for lawyer and judge decisionmakers are inconsistent 
with the inference of identity-protective cognition. None of the relevant 
differences in the probabilities of finding a violation conditional on 
worldview and experimental assignment are practically or statistically 
significant. This conclusion is illustrated by the high degree of overlaps in 
the relevant probability density distributions. 
B. Risk Perceptions 
Table A3 sets forth separate regression models for each of the societal-
risk perception scales.205 Predictors include the continuous cultural 
 
205 See supra subsection III.A.3. 
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worldview measures (“hfac” for hierarchy–egalitarianism and “ifac” for 
individualism–communitarianism), each of which is centered at 0; each 
subject type (dummy coded with member of the public as reference 
category); and appropriate cross-product interaction terms that measure the 
interaction of the cultural worldviews and each subject type separately. 
Environmental risk perceptions are known to polarize individuals who are 
relatively hierarchical and individualistic, on the one hand, and those who are 
relatively egalitarian and communitarian on the other.206 The regression 
model for the environmental risk scale—a composite of the subjects’ 
responses to items assessing their perception of the risks associated with 
global warming, nuclear power, air pollution, and water pollution—
corroborates that the risk perceptions of members of the public fit this 
pattern. The negative coefficients for “hfac” (b = -0.45, p < 0.01) and “ifac” 
(b = -0.25, p < 0.01) show that subjects who were members of the general 
population sample became more skeptical of environmental risk as they 
became more hierarchical and individualistic, and more risk-sensitive as they 
became more egalitarian and communitarian. 
In general, law students, lawyers, and judges were less concerned than 
members of the public with environmental risks. That conclusion is reflected 
in the negative coefficients of the predictors for those subject types (b = -0.27, 
p < 0.01; b = -0.44, p < 0.01; and b = -0.18, p < 0.01, respectively), which reflect 
the impact on environmental risk perceptions of being one of those types of 
subjects as opposed to a member of the public, when cultural worldviews are 
“controlled for” (by the setting of the predictor values for hfac and ifac at 0, 
their means). 
Social deviancy risks—those associated with recreational drug use, with 
premarital sex, and with policies to combat domestic terrorism—generate 
polarization among individuals whose worldviews are hierarchical and 
communitarian, on the one hand, and those whose worldviews are egalitarian 
and individualistic, on the other.207 The regression analysis is consistent with 
this expectation, although the coefficients for the hierarchy–egalitarianism 
predictor (b = 0.15, p < 0.01) and the individualism–communitarian predictor 
(b = 0.02, p = 0.33) indicate that for members of the public, all of the variance 
between individuals with these outlooks could be attributed to differences 
along the hierarchy–egalitarian worldview dimension. This was likely a result 
of the loss of strength in the worldview predictors associated with the 
 
206 See generally Kahan, supra note 13. 
207 Kahan & Braman, supra note 111 ; see also Wildavsky & Dake, supra note 125, at 44 (noting 
that “adherents of hierarchy perceive acts of social deviance to be dangerous,” while egalitarians 
“show much less concern” about such acts). 
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relatively low degree of variance with respect to the social deviancy risks in 
the general population, combined with the modest reliability of the two-item 
abbreviated version of the individualism–communitarianism scale. It is clear 
from the cross-product interaction terms, however, that differences in the 
communitarian–individualism predictor did contribute to variance for 
members of the student sample (b = -0.10, p < 0.05). It is also clear that being 
a student (b = -0.50, p < 0.01) and being a lawyer (b = -0.47, p < 0.01), but not 
being a judge (b = -0.04, p = 0.40), as opposed to being a member of the public 
predicted less concern with social deviancy risks when worldviews were held 
constant at their mean. 
 
Table A3: Multivariate Regression Analysis for Societal Risk  
Perceptions. 
  Environmental Social deviance 
hfac -0.45 (-20.48) 0.15 (7.17)
ifac -0.25 (-10.42) 0.02 (0.97) 
student -0.27 (-5.22) -0.50 (-10.12) 
lawyer -0.44 (-7.03) -0.47 (-7.84) 
judge  -0.18 (-3.49) -0.04 (-0.85) 
mhfac_x_student 0.10 (1.81) -0.04 (-0.85) 
hfac_x_lawyer 0.19 (3.58) 0.04 (0.73)
mhfac_x_judge 0.13 (1.97) 0.03 (0.52)
ifac_x_student 0.04 (0.90) -0.10 (-2.03) 
ifac_x_lawyer 0.18 (3.30) 0.02 (0.40) 
ifac_x_judge 0.01 (0.20) -0.04 (-0.62) 
Constant 0.16 (-6.50) 0.16 (6.58) 
R2  0.31 0.18
 
Note: N = 1523. The dependent variables are indicated societal risk scales. Regression weights are 
unstandardized OLS coefficients, with corresponding t-statistic indicated parenthetically. Bold 
typeface denotes that the indicated coefficient or model R2 is statistically significant at p < 0.05.  
 
Again, interpretation of the information in the regression models in 
relation to the study hypotheses requires considering the impact of 
appropriate combinations of predictors. Figure A1 graphically reports the 
regression model–estimated impacts of subjects’ worldviews on their risk 
perceptions. 
The results corroborate the idea that the risk perceptions of all subject 
types varied in patterns consistent with the inference that cultural cognition 
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shapes their processing of information about the relevant classes of risk. The 
impacts vary in size. For example, the estimated impact on members of the 
public is larger than that of the other subject types for environmental risks 
and smaller than the estimated impact on the other subject types for social 
deviancy risks.  
But unlike the results observed in relation to the legal problems, the 
impact of cultural worldviews is manifest and substantial for all subject types. 
The results do not furnish support, then, for the hypothesis that either the 
professional judgment characteristic of lawyers and judges or the experience 
of being a judge meaningfully counteracts identity-protective reasoning for 
out-of-domain judgments. 
 
Figure A3: Societal Risks  
Note: The curves reflect the probability density distribution for the estimated score on the indicated 
societal risk scale. Scores on the scales are normalized, with the mean set at 0 and with units in 
standard deviations. Predictors for cultural worldviews set at +1 for both hierarchy and individualism 
for “Hierarchical Individualist” (“HI”); at -1 for both for “Egalitarian Communitarian” (“EC”); at 
+1 for hierarchy and -1 for individualism in the case of Hierarchical Communitarian (“HC”); and at 
-1 for hierarchy and +1 for individualism for Egalitarian Individualist (“EI”), respectively. The most 
likely estimated score is the one corresponding to the apex of the curve; probabilities higher or lower 
become progressively smaller as one approaches the values at the extreme tails of the curve.  
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APPENDIX B. STUDY INSTRUMENT 
A. Legal Reasoning Problems 
Introduction. In this study, we would like to know how you would decide 
certain cases if you were a judge. You will first read about the case and then 
be asked to tell us how you would rule. 
 
[All subjects do both 1 & 2.  
Rotate order of 1 & 2. 
Randomize assignment to italicized and underscored conditions.] 
1. Littering 
You are a trial court judge presiding over a “civil penalty” action filed by 
the U.S. government under a law known as the Wildlife Environment 
Protection Act (“the Act” or “WEPA”). WEPA prohibits “littering, 
disposing, or depositing any form of garbage, refuse, junk, or other debris” 
on land designated as a national wildlife preserve. The Government has 
charged the defendants, [a group of construction workers,/members of a 
immigrants’ aid group,] with 400 separate WEPA violations (each subject to 
a $500 fine) for dispersing, and thereafter leaving unattended, 400 ten-gallon 
reusable plastic dispensers of drinking water in a wildlife refuge located in 
the desert along the United States–Mexico border. [The defendants placed the 
dispensers along a fifty-mile stretch in which they had been hired to do work on the 
construction of a “border fence” to keep out illegal aliens. The defendants anticipated 
drinking the water as they completed their work over a three-month 
period./Defendants placed the dispensers along a fifty-mile stretch known to 
be traversed by undocumented migrant farm workers. The defendants’ 
expected the water to be found and consumed by the migrant workers, who 
face a high risk of death from dehydration during attempts to cross the 
border.] 
The issue raised by the defendants’ motion is how to interpret WEPA. 
The defendants argue that they had not permanently discarded the plastic 
water dispensers but instead temporarily placed them in the desert with an 
expectation that they would be used and reused. Such behavior, they argue, 
does not count as “littering, disposing, or depositing any form of garbage, 
refuse, junk, or other debris” under WEPA. 
The Government focuses on the terms “depositing,” “junk,” and “other 
debris.” On its reading, the defendants “deposited” the water dispensers in 
the desert by placing them there and then leaving them unattended. The 
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terms “junk” and “debris,” the government argues, are by design very broad 
and cover all manmade materials, including reusable plastic water dispensers, 
foreign to the habitat of wildlife in the preserve. 
LITTERING_ruling. We are interested in knowing how you might 
decide the defendant’s motion to dismiss. That motion should be granted if 
the defendant’s interpretation of WEPA is correct but denied if the 
Government’s competing interpretation is correct. Of course, if you were 
really a judge in the case, you’d do more legal research, and hear arguments 
from the parties. But at this point, based on the materials you’ve read, which 
of these two rulings do you think you would make, and how confident do you 
think you’d be in your decision? 
Select one: 
( ) Based on my analysis of the statue, I would conclude that the 
defendants DID violate WEPA. 
( ) Based on my analysis of the statue, I would conclude that the 
defendants did NOT violate WEPA. 
2. Disclosure 
You are one judge of three on an appellate court. D, a former state police 
officer, is appealing his conviction under a state law known as the 
Government Information Disclosure Act (“Act” or “GIDA”). Evidence at 
trial shows that D told his sister, the owner of [a noncommercial “family 
planning” center that provides free information on birth control and abortion 
services/a religious “family planning” center that counsels women on 
alternatives to abortion], that C, an applicant for a job at the center, belonged 
to a local [anti-abortion/abortion-rights] group.  
The relevant language of GIDA states: 
No government employee shall disclose to anyone outside the 
government confidential information relating to an identifiable private 
citizen unless such disclosure is subject to a statutory exception. Any 
government employee who knowingly violates this Act shall be guilty of a class 
C Felony. 
The information about C’s membership in the [anti-abortion/abortion-
rights] group came from a police investigatory file. There is no dispute that 
the information was “confidential” under GIDA and not subject to any of the 
law’s exceptions (for example, the one allowing disclosure “when necessary 
to avert an imminent threat to public health or safety”).  
Testifying on his own behalf, D admitted that he “knew” that disclosure 
“was against departmental policy on confidential investigatory files,” but 
stated that he “had no idea” GIDA existed, and hence didn’t “know” 
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disclosure violated that or any other statute. He testified that he released the 
information about C’s group membership because he was “outraged” that C, 
in light of his [anti-abortion/abortion-rights] activities, would seek 
employment at the family-planning service operated by D’s sister. 
The issue before the appeals court is a narrow one: under GIDA, what 
exactly does the prosecution have to prove for a jury to find a defendant 
“knowingly violated this Act”? 
At trial, the defense requested the court to issue an instruction to the jury 
stating, “Because a person commits a crime under GIDA only when he 
‘knowingly violates’ the Act, you should return a verdict of guilty only if you 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that D knew his conduct violated GIDA.”  
The court rejected this request. Instead it instructed the jury, “Because a 
person commits a crime under GIDA only when he ‘knowingly violates’ the 
Act, you should return a verdict of ‘guilty’ only if you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that D (1) knew he was disclosing government information that (2) he 
knew was ‘confidential’ and that (3) he knew ‘related to a private citizen.’” The 
court told the jury that it “need not find, however, that D (4) knew his conduct 
violated GIDA or any other criminal law.”  
If the court of appeals finds that the trial court’s instruction reflected a 
correct reading of the Act, the court of appeals will uphold the conviction. If 
the court of appeals finds the trial court’s instruction was incorrect, the court 
of appeals will reverse the conviction and order a new trial at which the trial 
court will be required to give the instruction requested by the defense. 
DISCLOSURE_ruling. We are interested in knowing how you might 
decide this case if you were on the court of appeals. Of course, if you were 
really a judge in the case, you would do more legal research, hear arguments 
from the parties, and consult with your fellow judges. But at this point, based 
on the materials you’ve read, which of these two rulings do you think you 
would make, and how confident do you think you’d be in your decision? 
Select one: 
( ) Based on my analysis of the statue, I would conclude that the only facts 
the prosecution has to prove are (1) that the defendant employee knew he or 
she was disclosing information; (2) that the defendant employee knew that 
the information was “confidential”; and (3) that the defendant employee 
knew the information “related to” an “identifiable private citizen.” 
( ) Based on my analysis of the statute, I would conclude that in a criminal 
case under GIDA the prosecution must prove not only that the defendant 
knew that he or she was disclosing information that he or she knew was 
confidential and knew related to an identifiable private citizen; it must also 
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prove that the defendant employee knew that disclosure of such information 
would violate GIDA. 
B. Risk Perceptions 
Introduction. Now we would like to ask you about your views about risks. 
As individuals and as a society, we face a number of possible hazards. Some 
threaten people’s health, safety, or prosperity directly. Others threaten 
health, safety, or prosperity indirectly through the damage they can impose 
on the environment or the economy. How much risk do you believe each of 
the following poses to human health, safety, or prosperity? [0 “no risk at all”; 
1 “Very low risk”; 2 “Low risk”; 3 “Between low and moderate risk”; 4 
“Moderate risk”; 5 “Between moderate and high risk”; 6 “High risk”; 7 “Very 
high risk.”] 
 
[RANDOMIZE ORDER] 
 
1. AIRPOLLUTION. Air pollution 
2. WATERPOLLUTION. Water pollution 
3. NUKERISK. Nuclear power 
4. MARYJRISK. Legalization of marijuana  
5. TERROR. Domestic terrorism 
6. DRUG. Illegal drug trafficking 
7. TEENPREG. Teenage pregnancy 
8. WARMING. Global warming 
C. Cultural Worldviews 
Introduction. Finally, we’d like to ask you about some moral and social 
issues. 
 
[Rotate order of A & B, randomize order of items] 
 
A. Dimension 1 (Individualism–Communitarianism) 
 
People in our society often disagree about how far to let individuals go in 
making decisions for themselves. How strongly do you agree or disagree with 
each of these statements? [1 “Strongly disagree”; 2 “Moderately disagree”; 3 
“Slightly disagree”; 4 “Slightly agree”; 5 “Moderately agree”; 6 “Strongly 
agree.”] 
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1. Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people 
from hurting themselves.  
2. The government should stop telling people how to live their 
lives. 
B. Dimension 2 (Hierarchy–Egalitarianism) 
 
People in our society often disagree about issues of equality and 
discrimination. How strongly you agree or disagree with each of these 
statements? [1 “Strongly disagree”; 2 “Moderately disagree”; 3 “Slightly 
disagree”; 4 “Slightly agree”; 5 “Moderately agree”; 6 “Strongly agree.”] 
1. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.  
2. Our society would be better off if the distribution of wealth were 
more equal.  
